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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following situations.  First, police arrest a suspect in a 
robbery, take him to the station, and leave him in a room.  After a while, an 
officer enters the room and says, “I’m going to ask you a few questions 
about the robbery.  We know you did it, but I want you to tell me what 
happened in your own words.”  The suspect answers the questions and 
makes incriminating statements.  No one ever says anything to the suspect 
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about any rights he might have with respect to interrogation.  The 
government seeks to use those statements at trial.  
Second, investigators seek to question a government employee 
during an administrative audit of the use of government credit cards.  The 
employee says she does not want to respond for fear she might incriminate 
herself.  Her supervisor tells her she must answer the questions or lose her 
job.  She responds  and the government later seeks to prosecute her based on 
her incriminating statements. 
Third, law enforcement officials arrest a person suspected of taking 
part in a terrorist attack.  He refuses to provide any information.  Partly to 
obtain a confession and partly to learn if future attacks are imminent, 
officials engage in a variety of coercive interrogation tactics, such as 
hooding, sleep deprivation, prolonged uncomfortable positions, drastic 
temperature changes, slapping, and shaking.1  Broken, the suspect provides 
incriminating and useful information.
The first situation is a straightforward Miranda problem.  The 
suspect never received the Miranda warnings, and none of the exceptions 
apply, with the result that any incriminating statements made during that 
interrogation must be excluded.2  The second situation also seems 
straightforward.  The witness will receive use and derivative-use immunity 
for any incriminating statements that she made in response to her 
supervisor’s threats. 3  The only difference between the two situations is that 
Miranda’s application to otherwise uncompelled testimony has been 
described as a possibly non-constitutional prophylactic rule, whereas the 
remedy of immunity for compelled incrimination in civil cases – whether or 
not the wit ness is a government employee responding to threats – has been 
described as a constitutional right.4 Even that difference might seem minor 
after the Court held in Dickerson v. United States that “Miranda is a 
constitutional decision.”5  The third situation is easiest of all.  The 
1 U.S., Israeli, and British forces have used similar tactics to interrogate suspected 
terrorists.  See John T. Parry, What is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What if We Are?, 64 
U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 241-42, 250 (2003).
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  For the exceptions to Miranda, see 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 519-26 (3d ed. 2000).
3 See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
4 For statements that Miranda is prophylactic in a non-constitutional sense, see Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).  For statements that a constitutional right to 
receive immunity in response to compelled incrimination applies in civil cases, see 
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983); Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); 
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 440.
5 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
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interrogation violates the privilege against self-incrimination, any 
statements were involuntary as a matter of due process, and the suspect may 
bring a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens.6
Yet the three cases are harder than they first appear.  What if the 
government never seeks to use the statements against any of the suspects –
has there been any violation of a constitutional right, or is the government 
free to compel incriminating statements so long as they are not used at trial?  
At least with respect to the third case, the damages claim remains regardless 
of what happens at trial – yet what is the source of the claim?  If the claim 
asserts a violation of the privilege, then surely the suspects in the other 
cases could also state a claim for damages.  If the claim asserts a violation 
of due process, what exactly is the scope of the right, and does it extend to 
the other cases as well?  Given the context of the case and the government’s 
strong interest in obtaining information, does the suspect in the third case 
have a good constitutional claim on the merits?  Finally, if these suspects 
never made incriminating statements, could they still seek damages for their 
interrogators’ unconstitutional conduct?
Last Term, in Chavez v. Martinez,7 the Supreme Court addressed 
most of these issues.  In six opinions, the Court wrestled with the scope of 
the privilege, the status of Miranda, and the proper method of defining 
substantive due process rights.  A majority of the Court ruled that violations 
of Miranda will never support a claim for damages and violations of the 
privilege against self-incrimination will almost never support a damages 
claim.  Four justices would have gone further, moreover, to hold that 
damages are never available for violations of the priv ilege and that large 
parts of self-incrimination doctrine are merely non-constitutional 
prophylactic rules.  Little was said about the possibility of damages for 
violations of the due process constraint on involuntary confessions. The 
Court’s decision mea ns, in short, that civil rights actions over coercive 
interrogation practices will now fall largely within the domain of 
substantive due process, most likely under the notoriously vague “shocks 
6 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing damages 
action against federal agents directly under the Constitution); see Wiggins v. Martin, 150 
F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing § 1983 claims alleging widespread use of torture by 
Chicago police); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1997) (same).  For 
collections of cases involving torture or other physically abusive interrogation tactics by 
law enforcement in the United States, see Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2011-12 
(2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); John T. Parry, Judicial 
Restraints on Illegal State Violence: Israel and the United States, 35 VAND. J. TRANS. L.
73, 98 n.120 (2002) [hereinafter Parry, Judicial Restraints]; Welsh S. White, Defending 
Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 & n.73 (1986).
7 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
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the conscience” test.  And, critically, at least three justices were prepared to 
hold in Chavez that no substantive due process right to be free of coercive 
interrogations exists if government interests in obtaining information are 
sufficiently strong.
This article takes Chavez as the point of departure for considering a 
series of issues relating to constitutional interpretation, criminal procedure, 
and civil rights litigation.  Tempting though it may be to dismiss Chavez
because the Court was so fractured, the divisions on the Court are precisely 
what makes the case significant because they reveal the fault lines that run 
through much of our constitutional jurisprudence. Part II describes the facts 
and proceedings in Chavez, highlights the central features of the various 
opinions, and begins the task of analyzing the implications of Chavez for 
self-incrimination, due process, and civil rights litigation.  Part III assesses 
Chavez’s impact on the privilege against self-incrimination, including the 
Miranda doctrine but also – and more significantly – the doctrine of 
requiring immunity as a remedy for violations of the privilege.  I explain 
how the plurality opinion undermines core aspects of self-incrimination 
doctrine.
Because the plurality opinion described much of privilege doctrine 
as prophylactic, moreover, Part IV addresses the ongoing debate over the 
legitimacy of prophylactic rules in criminal procedure and constitutional 
law.  Chavez may be more important on this issue than Dickerson and it is 
at least the necessary pendent to Dickerson – together, the cases reveal a 
majority of the Court’s intention to preserve Miranda while carefully 
limiting its scope and effectiveness.8 Chavez is critical to this effort 
because it highlights a pervasive flaw in constitutional interpretation:  
although remedies are fundamental to the definition of constitutional rights, 
the Court rarely acts as if remedies were a meaningful part of constitutional 
doctrine.  Until it extricates itself from the debate over prophylactic rules, 
the Court will not be able to take remedies seriously as an aspect of 
constitutional law.  Indeed, after Chavez, we should seriously consider
jettisoning the idea of prophylactic rules entirely.
Part V returns to the issue of coercive interrogation.  I first provide 
an account of the privilege against self-incrimination that is true to the 
remedies available for its violation, and I pay particular attention to the 
context of civil rights claims for damages.  Text, history, and policy 
8 The Court has a chance to refine this position in two pending cases.  See United States v. 
Patane, U.S., No. 02-1183 (reconsidering fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine’s applicability 
to Miranda): Missouri v. Seibert, U.S. No. 02-1371 (considering validity of intentional 
interrogation without warnings followed by warnings and a second round of interrogation). 
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support, on balance, a broad privilege, including Miranda – but without a
damages remedy the right remains weak.  Drawing on Justice Harlan’s 
admonishment that self-incrimination issues reflect broader issues of consti-
tutional policy, I turn to the role of due process doctrines within the 
constitutional protection against coercive interrogation.  Violations of the 
due process voluntariness test will not support a damages claim under 
current doctrine, and substantive due process is inadequate on its own.  In 
the process, I also consider what Chavez tells us about the Court’s 
substantive due process jurisprudence more generally – in brief, that the 
Court remains sharply divided over the definition of substantive due process 
rights, and rights claims may have to yield to law enforcement needs, 
perhaps especially in the context of fighting terrorism. Indeed, under the 
plurality’s analysis, the Constitution permits torture.  Finally, with these 
concerns in mind, I propose a broad damages remedy for violations of the 
privilege and the due process voluntariness test.
II. CHAVEZ V. MARTINEZ
On the evening of November 28, 1997, Olivero Martinez, a farm 
worker, rode his bicycle home along a dark path through a vacant lot in 
Oxnard, California.  Nearby, police officers Maria Peña and Andrew 
Salinas were investigating suspected drug activity.  While they were 
questioning another person, they heard Martinez's bicycle.  Peña and 
Salinas ordered Martinez to stop, dismount, and place his hands behind his 
head while they frisked him.  
Salinas found a knife in Martinez's waistband, which Martinez later 
claimed he used for work.  Salinas apparently suspected the knife had a 
different purpose.  On the crucial issue of what happened next, accounts 
diverge.  According to Peña and Salinas, Martinez pulled away as Salinas 
sought to handcuff him.  As Salinas tried to subdue Martinez, they began to 
struggle.  Somehow, Martinez pulled Salinas's gun and pointed it at the 
officers.  Martinez, by contrast, charged that Salinas tackled him without 
warning after finding the knife and then drew his gun as they struggled.  
Martinez grabbed Salinas's hand to prevent him from using the gun.
Under both versions, Salinas next yelled, “He's got my gun.”  Peña 
responded by drawing her own gun and shooting Martinez several times in 
the head, chest, and legs, leaving him blind and paralyzed from the waist 
down.  The officers then handcuffed Martinez and placed him under arrest.
Soon thereafter, police officer Ben Chavez arrived at the scene with 
paramedics.  After discussing the events with Peña and Salinas, Chavez 
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rode in the ambulance when Martinez was taken to the hospital.9
At the hospital, Chavez spent forty-five minutes attempting to obtain 
a statement from Martinez at the same time that hospital personnel were 
attempting to treat him. Seeking a statement from a person who was 
involved in an altercation with police officers was plainly a legitimate 
investigative goal.  But Martinez was also a suspect in potential criminal 
activity arising from the altercation, yet Chavez never gave him the 
warnings required by Miranda. Moreover, the transcript of the 
interrogation makes clear that Martinez was not always coherent, was in 
great pain, and believed he might be dying.10  Chavez stopped the 
interrogation twice, apparently to allow treatment, but he also responded to 
many of Martinez's cries of pain with the demand that Martinez tell him 
what had happened and repeatedly told Martinez that he ought to talk if he 
thought he was dying.11
Martinez could not say when he was born, did not respond to 
questions asking him his name, and at first said that he did not know what 
had happened.12  Chavez used leading questions to get more information, 
and Martinez admitted fighting with the police, although he was unable to 
say why.13  At one point Martinez agreed that he had grabbed Salinas's gun, 
and at another point he said he pulled the gun from its holster.14  He 
insisted, however, that he simply wanted Salinas to stop, and he denied any 
intention to shoot the gun.15  Martinez also admitted drinking alcohol and 
using heroin that day.  In light of his condition at the hospital and the nature 
of the interview, little that Martinez said – whether exculpatory or 
9 I have drawn this account from Justice Thomas's opinion, see Chavez, 123 S.Ct. at 1999, 
and the Ninth Circuit's opinion, see Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 
2001), as well as from the parties' briefs, see Brief for the Petitioner at 2-3 and Brief for the 
Respondent at 1-2, Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (No. 01-1444).  The parties 
also disagreed about when Salinas found Martinez’s knife, but the Ninth Circuit and 
Supreme Court assumed Salinas found the knife during the patdown.
10 See Statement of Olivero Martinez, in Joint Appendix, Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 
1994 (2003) (No. 01-1444).  Chavez and Martinez spoke in Spanish but the transcript 
includes an English translation.
11 See id. at 9-11, 13-15, 18-20.
12 See id. at 7-10.
13 See id. at 11.
14 See id. at 11, 15-16.
15 See id. at 12, 17.  When first asked why he grabbed the gun, Martinez responded, “Yo 
quería tirar.”  Id. at 12.  According to the translator, “The word ‘tirar’ has three different 
meanings: to shoot, to throw away, [or] to drop.  Because of the ungrammatical structure of 
this sentence, the phrase is subject to more than [one] interpretation.”  Id. at 23.  In the 
context of the entire transcript, I do not believe Martinez was admitting that he wanted to 
shoot the gun (although, of course, that could have been his actual intention).
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inculpatory – can be deemed clearly reliable.
Martinez never faced any charges arising out of these events.  
Instead, he sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California, claiming that Peña and Salinas had 
stopped him without probable cause and used excessive force against him in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and that Chavez had subjected him to a 
coercive interrogation in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.16
The District Court rejected Chavez's assertion of qualified immunity 
and granted summary judgment to Martinez on his Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment inter rogation claims.17  The court compared the case to Mincey 
v. Arizona, a due process involuntary confession case in which the Supreme 
Court ruled that the results of a hospital interrogation of a suspect in 
extreme pain were inadmissible, and it found that “under the totality of the 
circumstances [Martinez's] statement was not voluntarily given.”18 In its 
analysis of qualified immunity, the court concluded that “no reasonable 
officer would believe that an interview of an individual receiving treatment 
for life-threatening injuries that resulted in blindness, paralysis, and 
excruciating pain was constitutionally permissible.”19
Chavez appealed the denial of qualified immunity.20  The Ninth 
Circuit agreed that Chavez's questioning had been unconstitutionally
coercive but also considered an issue that the district court had not 
addressed – whether a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination 
could occur if the state never sought to use the statements. Relying on its 
16 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2000; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 3.  Martinez also 
sued the City of Oxnard and two other individuals but dismissed those claims during the 
district court litigation.  See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Adjudication, Martinez v. City of Oxnard, CV 98-9313 FMC (AJWx) (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Order], in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16a, Chavez v. 
Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (No. 01-144).  Because Martinez sued state officials, all 
of his claims actually arose under the Fourteenth Amendment, which incorporates the 
Fourth, Eighth, and most of the Fifth Amendments against the states.  See Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Self-Incrimination Clause); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth 
Amendment); see also Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2008-09 (Scalia, J., concurring in part in the 
judgment).
17 See Order, supra note 16, at 30a.  The court denied summary judgment to Martinez on 
his other claims.  See id.  
18 Id. at 22a-23a (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)). 
19 Id. at 29a.
20 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (allowing interlocutory review of denials of 
qualified immunity).
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en banc opinion in Cooper v. Dupnik,21 the court held that coercive 
interrogation violates the privilege if the subject of the interrogation “could 
reasonably believe [that the statement] might be used in a criminal 
prosecution or lead to evidence that might be so used.”22  The court 
recognized that the Supreme Court described the privilege against self-
incrimination in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez as “a fundamental trial 
right of criminal defendants,” with the result that, “[a]lthough conduct by 
law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a 
constitutional violation occurs only at trial.”23  The Ninth Circuit, however, 
characterized this statement as dicta and declared itself bound by Cooper.24
The court then considered whether Chavez's conduct also “violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”25  Again relying on Cooper, the court stated 
simply that coercive interrogation violates the Fourteenth Amendment 
whether or not the resulting statement is ever used in a criminal 
proceeding.26 Finally, relying, as had the district court, on Mincey v. 
Arizona, the court held that Martinez's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights were clearly established at the time Chavez acted.27
In a confusing welter of opinions, the Supreme Court reversed the 
denial of qualified immunity and remanded for further proceedings.  Justice 
Thomas wrote the lead opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined i n full 
and which Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined for most relevant portions.
Justice Thomas first endorsed the Supreme Court’s current approach to 
issues of qualified immunity:  “we must first determine whether the 
officer‘s alleged conduct violated a constitutional right [before] 
consider[ing] whether the asserted right was ‘clearly established.’”28
21 963 F.2d 1220, 1238-44 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
22 Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
23 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
24 Martinez, 270 F.3d at 857 & n.3.
25 Id. at 857; see Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2008-09 (Scalia, J., concurring in part in the 
judgment) (arguing this language must be a reference to substantive due process).  
26 See Martinez, 270 F.3d at 857; Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1244-48.
27 See Martinez, 270 F.3d at 858-59.  
28 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2000 (plurality opinion) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 
(2001)); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998); Siegert v. 
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991).  Justice Thomas’s actual language – “we must first 
determine whether the officer‘s alleged conduct violated a constitutional right.  If not, the 
officer is entitled to qualified immunity, and we need not consider whether the asserted 
right was ‘clearly established’” – oddly suggests that defendants should receive immunity 
rather than dismissal on the merits of the claim if no federal rights were violated.   For 
discussions of the Court’s qualified immunity methodologies, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & 
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV.
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Justice Thomas began his examination of Martinez’s rights with the 
self-incrimination claim.  He stressed that the text of the Fifth Amendment 
states, “’No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself,’” and endorsed the Court's statement in Verdugo-
Urquidez that the self-incrimination privilege is a trial right.29  He quickly 
concluded that Martinez had no Fifth Amendment claim because the state 
never initiated any criminal proceedings against him and never compelled 
him to give formal testimony.30  Justice Thomas went on to explain why the 
Ninth Circuit's holding could not “be reconciled with our case law.”31  He 
characterized the Court's precedents as standing for the idea that “the 
government may compel witnesses to testify at trial or before a grand jury, 
on pain of contempt, so long as the witness is not the target of the criminal 
case in which he testifies.”32 It followed, according to Justice Thomas, that 
“mere coercion does not violate the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
absent use of the compelled statements in a criminal case against the 
witness.”33
Justice Thomas next considered the significance of “prophylactic 
rules designed to safeguard the core constitutional right protected by the 
Self-Incrimination Clause.”34 The first such rule is “an evidentiary 
privilege that protects witnesses from being forced to give incriminating 
testimony, even in noncriminal cases, unless that testimony has been 
immunized from use and derivative use in a future criminal proceeding.”35
The second is “the Miranda exclusionary rule,”36 which Justice Thomas 
described as prophylactic without mentioning the Court’s holding in 
Dickerson that “Miranda is a constitutional decision”37 – a statement that, 
while admittedly ambiguous, is nonetheless relevant to whether Miranda
L. REV. 1731, 1749-53, 1820-24 (1991); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in 
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999) [hereinafter Jeffries, Right-Remedy].
29 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2000-01 (plurality opinion) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V) 
(emphasis added by the Court).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 2001.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 2002.  Justice Thomas also declared that Martinez's probable lack of knowledge 
that the compelled statement could not be used against him made no difference, because his 
ignorance did not increase the degree of compulsion and he would receive “automatic
protection” from the use in criminal proceedings of that statement or evidence derived from 
it.  Id. at 2002 (emphasis in original).
34 Id. at 2003.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
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can support a § 1983 claim.38
Because prophylactic rules “do not extend the scope of the 
constitutional right itself,” Justice Thomas declared, “violations [of these 
rules] do not violate the constitutional rights of any person.”39  More to the 
point, Justice Thomas asserted that Chavez’s failure to comply with 
Miranda “did not violate Martinez’s constitutional rights and cannot be 
grounds for a § 1983 action.”40  In short, Chavez’s interrogation of Martinez 
outside Miranda could not support a damages claim under the Fifth 
Amendment.  
Justice Thomas moved quickly to insist that his analysis “do[es] not 
mean that police torture or other abuse that results in a confession is 
constitutionally permissible so long as the statements are not used at trial.”41
Rather, any claims would simply arise under due process.42  Justice Thomas 
also asserted that his switch to due process analysis was consistent with
Graham v. Connor, which held that claims of excessive force during any 
“seizure” of a person must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not 
due process, because the Fourth Amendment “provides an explicit textual 
source of constitutional protection.”43  Justice Thomas explained that if 
Martinez could bring a claim under the privilege, then he should not be able 
to bring a claim under due process, but if he had no privilege claim, due 
process might be available.44
38 See id. at 446, 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the ambiguity of the majority 
opinion); Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in 
Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 899-902 (2001) (same).  For assessments of Dickerson
that contend Miranda is a constitutional and a prophylactic ruling, see WELSH S. WHITE, 
MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON
109-11 (2001); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe 
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1030 (2001) [hereinafter Klein, Identifying]; David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, 
and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958 (2001).
39 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2003 (plurality opinion).  Justice Thomas’s discussion of immunity 
seems in tension with his concurring opinion in United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-
56 (2000), in which he relied on original understandings to suggest that the privilege 
prohibits compelled production of documents in criminal investigations absent immunity.
40 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004 (plurality opinion).
41 Id.
42 See id
43 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 
(1998) (characterizing Graham as holding that the availability of any specific constitutional 
claim precludes reliance on due process).
44 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004 & n.5 (plurality opinion).  For criticisms of Graham, see 
Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme 
Court‘s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 303, 399-407 (2001); Toni 
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On the one hand, this explanation is inconsistent with Graham if the 
privilege is an “explicit textual source of protection” against coercive 
interrogation.  On the other hand, if Justice Thomas’s trial right 
interpretation of the privilege is correct, then it does not protect against 
custodial coercion outside the trial, and his statement is consistent with 
Graham.  More interesting is the fact that the other five justices – all of 
whom seem to agree that the privilege provides at least some protection 
against coercive interrogation – did not even consider Graham’s application 
to Martinez’s claims.  With only four justices willing to invoke Graham and 
the apparent willingness of other justices to allow overlapping constitutional 
claims, one might plausibly conclude that Gr aham’s doctrinal significance
is shaky.45
As Justice Thomas analyzed the substantive due process issue, two 
claims were available to Martinez. 46 The first was that the interrogation 
“shocked the conscience.”47  The “’most likely’” foundation for such a 
claim is conduct that was, first, “’intended to injure’” and, second, 
“’unjustifiable by any government interest.’”48  Justice Thomas found no 
evidence of intent to injure.49 He also asserted that “the need to investigate 
whether there had been police misconduct constituted a justifiable 
government interest given the risk that key evidence would have been lost if 
Martinez had died [without telling] his side of the story.”50
The second substantive due process claim that Justice Thomas 
M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot for Jot” Account of Substantive Due 
Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086 (1998); Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: 
Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 833 (2003). See also Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal 
Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1, 75-76 (2001) (arguing for due process as a source of some criminal 
procedure doctrines precisely because it is more general than the Fifth Amendment).
45 See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE 
CONSTITUTION 41 (2003 Supp.) (highlighting the fact that in Chavez, “by contrast [with 
Graham], although six justices addressed and rejected the claim under the Fifth 
Amendment, a majority of the Court expressed a willingness to have the claim addressed as 
a matter of substantive due process”).
46 Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined this part of the opinion.  Justice 
O’Connor did not join Justice Thomas’s discussion of due process and did not express any 
view on the issue.
47 The “shocks the conscience” standard originated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952), and the Court applied it to a § 1983 police misconduct claim in Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833.
48 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849).
49 Id. at 2005.  
50 Id.
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considered was that Chavez’s interrogation of Martinez deprived him of a 
fundamental right under circumstances that would not satisfy strict scrutiny.  
Justice Thomas insisted on a “’careful description’” of any potential 
fundamental right.51  But he then interpreted Martinez’s claim broadly and 
found “no basis in our prior jurisprudence or in our Nation’s history and 
traditions to suppose that freedom from unwanted police questioning is so 
fundamental that it cannot be abridged absent a ‘compelling state 
interest.’”52
Significantly, Justice Thomas failed to consider whether Martinez’s 
statements were voluntary, even though that issue had been central to the 
lower courts’ analysis.  Due process prohibits the use at trial of involuntary 
statements – a protection that is distinct from the Self-Incrimination 
Clause.53  Language in some of the due process cases also suggests a 
substantive right to be free of coercive interrogation that produces an 
involuntary statement regardless of whether the government seeks to use the 
statement at trial.54  Moreover, some lower courts have allowed § 1983 
actions based on violations of the due process voluntariness test.55
51 Id. at 2006 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
52 Id.  Justice Thomas noted the Court should take account of Martinez’s medical condition 
and the urgency of the situation, and his ultimate analysis referred to “these 
circumstances,” id., but his reasoning turned on the supposed assertion of a broad right to 
be free from unwanted police questioning.
53 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-34 (2000); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 163 (1986); WHITE, supra note 38, at 39-51.
54 See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-67 (characterizing exclusion of testimony as a remedy for 
unconstitutionally coercive interrogation tactics and thereby suggesting that the 
interrogation and not the admission of testimony was the focus of due process); Haynes v. 
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (stating a confession obtained “through the use of 
threats is violative of due process”); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (stating 
violent interrogation “serves no lawful purpose, invalidates confessions that otherwise 
would be convincing, and is universally condemned by the law”); Williams v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 97, 101 (1951) (stating violent interrogation methods “deprive[] the victim 
of a right under the Constitution”); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (conceding violent interrogation “per se, is an outlaw”); Chambers 
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1940) (“The Constitution proscribes such lawless means 
irrespective of the end.”); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (describing 
interrogation methods as “revolting to the sense of justice”); see also WHITE, supra note 
38, at 39-48; John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should 
Torture be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743, 748-51 (2002).
55 See Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946, 952-54 (8th Cir. 2001); Edwards v. 
Pretsch, 180 F. Supp. 2d 499, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence, 
81 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1348 n.61 (2003) [hereinafter Klein, Silence] (collecting earlier 
cases); Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause 
and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 434-44, 449-50 (1994) 
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Whether Justice Thomas simply chose not to consider the 
voluntariness issue, whether he thought it was irrelevant to the substantive 
due process claim, or whether he thought it was subsumed within the shocks 
the conscience inquiry, is unclear. In previous cases, however, the Court 
has indicated that compulsion for purposes of the privilege is the same as 
involuntariness for purposes of due process,56 which could mean that the 
Chavez plurality saw no reason to consider voluntariness once it had 
finished with the privilege.  Notably, moreover, in his discussion of the self-
incrimination claim, Justice Thomas dismissed Mincey v. Arizona – upon 
which the district court and court of appeals had relied and which Justices 
Kennedy and Ginsburg would cite in their opinions – as “a case addressing 
the admissibility of a coerced confession under the Due Process Clause.”57
His failure to consider the voluntariness claim as an independent basis for 
damages, combined with his characterization of Mincey as a case solely 
about admissibility of evidence, supports the idea that Justice Thomas 
believes a due process involuntary confession claim is different from a 
substantive due process claim and cannot support at § 1983 action, perhaps 
because, as a procedural or fair trial claim, it is the functional equivalent of 
a compelled confession claim under the privilege.58
Justice Souter delivered a two part opinion.  The second part was a 
majority opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, and it state d simply that the viability of Martinez’s substantive due 
process claim would be an issue for remand.59  The first part, joined only by 
[hereinafter Klein, Deconstitutionalized] (collecting cases and discussing efforts to obtains 
damages for violations of Miranda); see also Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of 
Constitutional Confession Law – The International Arena, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 889-95 (2003) 
(suggesting the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Colorado v. Connelly is the doctrinal 
source for due process damages claims relating to confessions).
56 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307, 309 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 
649, 654 (1984).  For additional discussion of this issue, see infra notes 259-62 and 
accompanying text.
57 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004 n.4 (plurality opinion) (discussing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 
U.S. 385 (1978)) (emphasis in original).
58 See also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 9, at 8 (arguing the due process involuntary 
confession cases are about fair trial procedures); Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 17, Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (No. 01-
1444) (same).
59 Id. at 2008 (majority opinion).  Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg joined this part 
of the opinion to ensure a controlling judgment.  See id. at 2012-13 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2018 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); id. at 2019-20 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice 
Scalia’s opinion took issue with the idea that Martinez’s substantive due process claim 
remained alive on remand.  He read the Ninth Circuit’s opinion – correctly, in my view –
as ruling in part that Martinez had a valid substantive due process claim, and he joined 
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Justice Breyer, explained how they reached that holding.  Justice Souter 
began by agreeing with the plurality that Martinez could not bring a § 1983 
claim based on the Fifth Amendment or Miranda.  His reasoning, however, 
was quite different from that of the plurality.  According to Justice Souter, 
grants of immunity and allowing witnesses to invoke the privilege outside 
the criminal trial – as well as Miranda – are all “Fifth Amendment 
holdings” even if they are also “outside the Fifth Amendment’s core.”60
Presumably for that reason, Justice Souter refused to state that a vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment or Miranda could never support a § 1983 
claim.  Rather, he found only that Martinez had failed to make “the 
‘powerful showing’ . . . necessary to expand protection of the privilege 
against self-incrimination to the point of civil liability he asks us to 
recognize here.”61 As a result, Justice Souter agreed that Martinez could 
only bring a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.
Referring to Justice Stevens’s separate opinion, he said simply that 
“Martinez has a strong argument in support of such a position” and held that 
the validity of the claim was a matter for remand.62
Justice Thomas’s opinion seeking to reverse that ruling.  Id. at 2008-09 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part in the judgment).  Justice Scalia also asserted that, if the Ninth Circuit 
had not addressed the substantive due process claim, Martinez had waived it by not raising 
it before the Ninth Circuit.  Id. at 2009-10.
60 Id. at 2007 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
61 Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 515, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  
Justice Souter did not directly address the relevance of the due process involuntary 
confession cases, but he seemed to equate them with the privilege.  After noting Martinez’s 
testimony “would clearly be inadmissible” as a matter of due process under Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), see Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2006 (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment), he distinguished the exclusion remedy from the damages remedy.  “To 
recognize such a constitutional cause of action for compensation would, of course, be well 
outside the core of Fifth Amendment protection.”  Id. at 2006-07.  Yet he then suggested 
that Chavez’s conduct might be sufficient to support a damages claim as a matter of 
substantive due process.  Id. at 2008.  If Justice Souter meant to say that all involuntary 
statements support a substantive due process claim for damages, he presumably would 
have said so clearly, and such a result would have made his careful discussion of the 
privilege largely irrelevant from a plaintiffs’ or remedial standpoint because damages 
would be available for the same conduct under due process.  Thus, Justice Souter probably 
meant to recognize two tiers of due process claims – those that qualify for the exclusion 
remedy, and those that also qualify for damages.  Where he would draw the line between 
the two was also left unsaid.
62 Id. at 2008.  Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
523 U.S. 833 (1998), which held government interests can justify government conduct that 
otherwise would violate substantive due process rights.  Having seen Justice Thomas’s 
straightforward application of that idea in Chavez, see 123 S. Ct. at 2005, while also 
sympathizing with Justice Stevens’ views, Justice Souter may have decided it would be 
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Carefully read, Justice Souter’s opinion asserts that Miranda and 
other doctrines that protect the core trial right of the privilege against self-
incrimination are themselves interpretations of the Constitution and are not 
merely prophylactic or non-constitutional.  His reliance on Justice Harlan’s 
Miranda dissent underscores that the question for him was whether to 
expand protection of Fifth Amendment rights by allowing an additional 
remedy beyond the exclusionary rule for their violation.  Put differently, his 
focus was on the appropriate remedy as well as, to some extent, on the 
relationship of remedies to the scope of rights, and his opinion is largely an 
example of exercising discretion to select an appropriate remedy for a 
constitutional violation.63
Justice Stevens, in turn, directly contested Justice Thomas’s
discussion of substantive due process and his failure to consider the due 
process voluntariness cases.  He noted that the Court has found in numerous 
cases that “unusually coercive police interrogation procedures” violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.64  He declared that the 
interrogation of Martinez “was the functional equivalent of an attempt to 
obtain an involuntary confession from a prisoner by torturous means” and 
was thus “a classic example of a violation of a constitutional right ‘implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.’”65  Justice Stevens also took Justice 
Thomas to task for characterizing Miranda as prophylactic and non-
constitutional in apparent defiance of Dickerson.66  For all of his focus on 
due process, however, Justice Stevens never said clearly which due process 
claims should support a damages cause of action, perhaps because he felt 
the facts of this case easily supported a claim for damages.
better to remain silent rather than seek in this case to resolve the tension between the two 
positions.
63 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 282 
(2000) (arguing for greater consideration of alternatives to damages in civil rights actions 
and modification of qualified immunity doctrine to obtain this result) [hereinafter Jeffries, 
Disaggregating]; cf. Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: 
Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used 
Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907 (1989) (arguing for a more sensitive consideration of the 
source and scope of various criminal procedure rights in order to provide the most 
appropriate remedies for their violation).  Whether the exclusionary rule is a sufficient 
remedy by itself for Fifth Amendment violations is doubtful, especially in the Miranda
context, where the incentives favor police disregard of the required warnings.  See Steven 
D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 502-25 (2002) 
(examining the incentives to violate Miranda and concluding they overwhelm the 
incentives to comply in many instances); Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1355-57 (same).
64 Id. at 2011 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65 Id. at 2010, 2012 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
66 Id. at 2012-13 n.3.
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Insisting that “[a] constitutional right is traduced the moment torture 
or its close equivalents are brought to bear,” Justice Kennedy dissented 
from the Court’s rejection of Martinez’s self -incrimination claim.67 First, 
however, he concurred in the plurality’s conclusion that a Miranda violation 
can never support a § 1983 claim.  Yet unlike Justice Thomas, he cited 
Dickerson for the idea that the Miranda warnings are “a constitutional 
requirement.”68  The reason why a violation of Miranda cannot support a § 
1983 claim, therefore, is not the lack of a constitutional violation.  Instead, 
the question – as it had been for Justice Souter – was one of remedial 
discretion.  The exclusionary rule, according to Justice Kennedy, “is a 
complete and sufficient remedy.”69
Although a Miranda violation could not support a § 1983 claim, 
Justice Kennedy insisted that Chavez had violated the Fifth Amendment 
because the Self-Incrimination Clause is more than a trial right. Rather, it is 
“a substantive constraint on the conduct of the government, not merely an 
evidentiary rule governing the work of the courts.”70  The substantive aspect 
of the Clause “protects an individual from being forced to give answers 
demanded by an official in any context when the answers might give rise to 
criminal liability in the future.”71  Moreover, relying on Kastigar v. United 
States, Justice Kennedy stated that the privilege against self-incrimination 
applies whenever a “testimonial duty” arises, whether “’civil or criminal, 
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory.’”72 Finally, the 
relevance of “what the witness reasonably believes will be the future use of 
a statement . . . indicates the existence of a present right.”73 Although he 
did not say so directly, Justice Kennedy clearly took issue with Justice 
Thomas’s assertion that the ability to invoke the privilege in non-criminal 
proceedings is only prophylactic and is not a constitutional aspect of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause.
Justice Kennedy sought to bolster his argument by appealing to 
popular understandings of the privilege:
67 Id. at 2013 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68 Id. (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000)).
69 Id.; see supra note 63.
70 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2014 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Justice Kennedy recognized that Justices Thomas and Souter had relied on United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), but he asserted the case was inapposite because it 
addressed concerns different from those at issue in Chavez.  See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 
2014-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 2014.
72 Id. (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972)).
73 Id.
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It should come as an unwelcome surprise to judges, 
attorneys, and the citizenry as a whole that if a legislative 
committee or a judge in a civil case demands incriminating 
testimony without offering immunity, and even imposes 
sanctions for failure to comply, that the witness and counsel 
cannot insist the right against compelled self-incrimination is 
applicable then and there.74
Moreover,
To tell our whole legal system that when conducting a 
criminal investigation police officials can use severe 
compulsion or even torture with no present violation of the 
right against compelled self-incrimination can only diminish 
a celebrated provision in the Bill of Rights.  A Constitution 
survives over time because the people share a common, 
historic commitment to certain simple but fundamental 
principles which preserve their freedom.75
Ultimately, Justice Kennedy insisted that these basic understandings support 
the conclusion that the Self-Incrimination Clause prohibits “the act of 
torturing to obtain a confession.”76
Justice Kennedy recognized that a majority disagreed with him and 
preferred due process as the vehicle for considering Martinez’s claims.  But 
that disagreement, he contended, should not affect the outcome of the case:
Turning to this essential, but less specific, guarantee, it seems 
to me a simple enough matter to say that use of torture or its 
equivalent in an attempt to induce a statement violates an 
individual’s fundamental right to liberty of the person.  The 
Constitution does not countenance the official imposition of 
severe pain or pressure for purposes of interrogation.  This is 
true whether the protection is found in the Self-Incrimination
Clause, the broader guarantees of the Due Process Clause, or 
both.77
Justice Kennedy admitted that the police “may have legitimate reasons, 
born of exigency, to question a person who is suffering or in distress.”  He 
insisted, however, that the police may not – as Chavez did – “prolong a 
suspect’s suffering against the suspect’s will,” “give the impression that 
severe pain will be alleviated only if the declarant cooperates,” or otherwise 
74 Id. at 2015.
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 2016.
77 Id. 
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“exploit [a suspect’s] pain and suffering with the purpose and intent of 
securing an incriminating statement.”78
Although Justice Kennedy supported damages for violations of 
either the privilege or the due process clauses that result from “severe pain 
or pressure for purposes of interrogation,”79 he, too, did not discuss the 
overall relationship between damages claims and confessions that are 
involuntary as a matter of due process.  Like Justice Stevens, he may have 
thought exploration of this issue was unnecessary on the facts of this case.  
Yet his position that damages should be available for violations of the 
privilege creates the possibility that he  would also support damages for a 
broad range of involuntary confessions.
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the Self-
Incrimination and Due Process Clauses.80  She would have gone farther, 
however.  To Justice Ginsburg, the case did not turn on Martinez’s beliefs 
about the connection between medical treatment and giving a statement, or 
on Chavez’s intentions.81  Rather, as in Mincey v. Arizona, the record made 
clear that “’the totality of the circumstances in this case’ establishes ‘that 
[Martinez’s] statement was not voluntarily given.’  It is indeed ‘hard to 
imagine a situation less conducive to the exercise of a rational intellect and 
a free will.’”82  Although she did not say that damages should be available 
any time a statement “was not voluntarily given,” Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion comes closest to suggesting that violation of the due process 
voluntariness test will support a claim for damages.
The Court’s opinions in Chavez reveal important divisions and 
tensions in criminal procedure and civil rights jurisprudence.  Less clear is 
whether any of them helps chart a path toward resolution of these tensions. 
III. CHAVEZ AND THE DESTABILIZATION OF SELF-INCRIMINATION DOCTRINE
The Chavez plurality sought to restrict the privilege against self-
incrimination, cast doubt on the status of Miranda only three years after 
Dickerson, and – in a startling move – suggested  that the grant of immunity 
for compelled testimony is nothing more than a non-constitutional 
prophylactic rule.  Although reasonable minds can certainly differ about the 
proper scope of the privilege, the plurality’s analysis is flawed, and the root 
78 Id. at 2017.
79 Id. at 2016.
80 Id. at 2018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  She did not express 
a view on the status of Miranda or its ability to support a § 1983 action.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 2019 (quoting Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2018 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978))).
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of the flaw is the plurality’s – and, indeed, the entire Court’s – difficulty 
grappling with the place of remedies in constitutional law.
A. The Uncertain Scope of the Privilege
For the Chavez plurality, the privilege against self-incrimination is a 
trial right, by which they mean that a compelled confession implicates the 
Fifth Amendment only when the government seeks to introduce it at trial.  
The privilege is irrelevant as a source of enforceable rights if the 
government never seeks to introduce the confession.  For Justices Souter 
and Breyer, the core of the privilege is the trial right, but it also sweeps 
more broadly.  Only Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg clearly embraced an 
expansive conception of the privilege as a robust constraint on conduct 
outside the trial.  And only they would have used the Fifth Amendment to 
hold that Chavez’s conduct violated the Constitution.
The text of the privilege – “No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself”83 – feeds the Court’s 
uncertainty.  The Chavez plurality plausibly contended that these words 
apply only when a person is “prose cuted for a crime” and do not extend to 
“the entire criminal investigatory process, including police 
interrogations.”84 Others, however, have read the text more broadly and 
equally plausibly to include, at least, “a person haled before a grand jury, 
who is already the subject of a complaint or is believed by the prosecutor to 
be a likely subject for indictment” and “any witness in criminal 
proceedings.”85
The original understanding of the privilege also creates uncertainty, 
in part because it reveals a legal context dramatically and perhaps 
83 U.S. CONST. amend V.
84 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2000; see also id. at 2000-01 (“In our view, a ‘criminal case’ at the 
very least requires the initiation of legal proceedings.  We need not decide today the precise 
moment when a ‘criminal case’ commences; it is enough to say that police questioning 
does not constitute a ‘case’ any more than a private investigator’s precomplaint activities 
constitute a ‘civil case.’”).  
85 Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional 
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 676 (1968).  Judge Friendly also included “the 
preliminary hearing before a magistrate of a person against whom a complaint has been 
filed,” id., but the Chavez plurality’s interpretation seems to include preliminary hearings.   
For a roughly consistent discussion of the text’s possibilities, see Clymer, supra note 63, at 
459-61.  For a compelling argument that the word “witness” in both the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments leads to the conclusion that the privilege bars the use of “compelled pretrial 
statements as evidence of guilt,” see Donald A. Dripps, Against Police Interrogation – And 
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CIMINOLOGY 699, 724 n.95 
(1988) [hereinafter Dripps, Against].
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irretrievably different from our own.86  Thus, some commentators have 
argued the privilege applies to pretrial custodial interrogation because such 
questioning is the modern-day equivalent of founding-era pretrial 
examination by magistrates.87  Yet application of the privilege (or its 
common law precursors) to pretrial examination in the founding era was 
uncertain.  To the extent the privilege prohibited torture and examination 
under oath but not unsworn examination,88 it plainly applied in some pre-
trial contexts, but the allowance of unsworn testimony makes the analogy 
less exact than some of its proponents might desire.  Moreover, other 
commentators use the original understanding against the privilege, 
suggesting it is outdated if its primary purpose was to prevent torture.89
Against these uncertainties, which create space for the plurality’s 
interpretation, stands a host of cases, stretching back over a century, that 
allow invocation of the privilege outside of criminal trials and outside the 
criminal process altogether.90  As Justice Rehnquist explained in Michigan 
v. Tucker,
Where there has been genuine compulsion of testimony, the 
right has been given broad scope.  Although the 
constitutional language in which the privilege is cast might 
be construed to apply only to situations in which the 
prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against 
himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been so 
limited.  The right has been held applicable to proceedings 
before a grand jury, to civil proceedings, to congressional 
investigations, to juvenile proceedings, and to other statutory 
86 See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to 
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996).  For other accounts, see Lawrence Herman, 
The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimina-
tion and the Involuntary Confession Rule, Part I, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (1992), Part II, 53 
OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1992); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the 
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086 (1994).
87 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 438 (1987) 
[hereinafter Schulhofer, Reconsidering]; Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney 
General on the Law of Pretrial Interrogation, reprinted in 22 MICH. J. L. REF. 437, 494 
(1989).
88 See Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2651-53; see also Herman, Part I, supra note 86, at 162-
63 (providing a consistent assessment of the pre-revolutionary era).
89 See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 
33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1077-79 (1986).  For actual cases of torture, critics of the 
privilege rely on the due process clauses for a remedy.  See id. at 1079-80.
90 For a discussion of the cases, see Clymer, supra note 63, at 459; infra notes 96-103 and 
accompanying text.
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inquiries.91
Against this background, the Chavez plurality’s suggestion that the 
constitutional scope of the privilege should be limited to a defendant’s
testimony in criminal prosecutions would dramatically reengineer Fifth 
Amendment doctrine.  Absent a strong justification for such a move – and 
few judges or scholars would argue that text or original understanding 
alone, even if clear, is sufficient in the face of longstanding practice and 
precedent92 – we must look elsewhere to determine the proper scope of the 
privilege.
Given the longstanding precedent in favor of a privilege broader 
than a criminal trial right, one might plausibly look to the Court’s own 
words for a more certain understanding of the privilege.  Yet caselaw ends 
up pointing in inconsistent directions.  Cases from the Warren Court 
describe a strong privilege that constrains p olice conduct well before trial.  
One of the farthest reaching cases is Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 
which sets out a list of “polices of the privilege” intended to drive the 
development of doctrine:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the 
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our 
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial 
system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating 
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and 
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-
individual balance by requiring the government to leave the 
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him 
and by requiring the government in its contest with the 
individual to shoulder the entire load[;]" our respect for the 
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each 
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private 
life[;]" our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our 
91 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) (emphasis added and citations omitted).
92 Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(suggesting “stare decisis and reliance interests” may make it “too late in the day” to return 
to the original understanding of the commerce clause), and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 
491 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing 
against overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), even if it contravenes the text of 
the Constitution, because “the question is . . . close,” Hans has been “consistently adhered 
to for almost a century,” and it has had a “pervasive effect upon statutory law”), with
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-56 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting 
original understandings of the privilege against self incrimination could require revision of 
existing doctrine to provide broader protection for documents).
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realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to 
the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."93
Under Murphy’s interpretation of these somewhat vague policies, the 
plurality’s analysis in Chavez is insupportable.
Two years after Murphy, the Court reaffirmed the expansive view of 
the Fifth Amendment in Miranda v. Arizona.  The Court described the 
privilege “in part as an individual’s substantive right, a ‘right to a private 
enclave where he may lead a private life.’”94  As a result, the Court insisted 
that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available 
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all 
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way 
from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”95  Even leaving aside the 
constitutional status of the Miranda warnings, this conception of the 
privilege is inconsistent with that of the Chavez plurality and perhaps finds 
resonance only in the opinions of Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg.
Worth noting, as well, is that the Warren Court cases drew on a 
tradition of judicial celebration of the privilege. These laudatory statements 
describe the privilege as a broad right and often as a powerful constraint on 
government conduct wherever it takes place.  As early as 1886, in Boyd v. 
United States, the Court declared  that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
together stand for the following proposition:
[A]ny compulsory discovery by extorting the party’s oath, or 
compelling the production of his private books and papers, to 
convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to 
the principles of a free government.  It is abhorrent to the 
instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of 
an American.  It may suit the purposes of despotic power; but 
it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and 
personal freedom.96
So, too, in Brown v. Walker, in the course of upholding the statutory 
93 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
94 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55)..
95 Id. at 467.
96 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886).  Six years later, the Court toned down the rhetoric but 
insisted that the privilege – which it described as “an ancient principle of the law of 
evidence” – “must have a broad construction in favor of the right which it was intended to 
secure.”  Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562, 563 (1892); see also id. at 584-85 
(noting “the manifest purpose of the constitutional provisions, both of the States and of the 
United States, . . . to prohibit the compelling of testimony of a self-criminating kind from a 
party or a witness,” and requiring a “liberal construction” for “constitutional provisions for 
the protection of personal rights”).
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immunity provisions applicable to Interstate Commerce Commission 
proceedings, the Court emphasized the importance of the privilege:
So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress 
themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the 
States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question 
an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a 
maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, 
became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a 
constitutional enactment.97
The Court concluded its opinion by declaring that the privilege “is justly 
regarded as one of the valuable prerogatives of the citizen.”98
Bram v. United States applied the privilege to a statement obtained 
during custodial interrogation.  The Court endorsed the language and 
reasoning of Boyd and Brown, and stated that, at common law, the privilege 
“was there considered as resting on the law of nature, and was embedded in 
that system as one of its great and distinguishing attributes.”99 Because 
97 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896).  The Court also provided the following justification for the 
privilege:
While the admissions or confession of the prisoner, when voluntarily and 
freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of criminating 
evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent 
connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the 
questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation 
to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to 
push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which 
is so painfully evident in may of the earlier [British] trials . . . made the 
system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.
Id. at 597.
98 Id. at 610; see also ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478-80 (1894) (relying on Boyd and 
Counselman to hold the privilege applies to administrative proceedings).  The dissenters in 
Brown would have held that the transactional immunity provided by the statute could not 
displace the privilege.  Justice Field observed that “[t]he reprobation of compulsory self-
incrimination is an established doctrine of our society” that reflects “’the long struggle 
between the opposing forces of the spirit of individual liberty . . . and the collective power 
of the State.’”  Brown, 161 U.S. at 637 (Field, J., dissenting).  He also contended that “the 
essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own guilt is obvious to 
every one,” and he decried the “sense of personal degradation” that accompanied 
compelled incrimination.  Id.  The Brimson dissenters appear to have agreed with the Fifth 
Amendment holding, but they disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that a contempt 
proceeding for refusal to comply with an administrative investigation is an Article III case 
or controversy.  See ICC v. Brimson, 155 U.S. 3, 4 (1894) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
99 168 U.S. 532, 545 (1897). The Court also ruled that the constitutional privilege follows 
the common law rule, which it described in the following way:
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Bram’s statements were not “the result of a purely voluntary mental action” 
and rather were “the result of either hope or fear, or both, operating on the 
mind,” the Court found the confession involuntary and remanded for a new 
trial at which the confession would be inadmissible.100
Even Twining v. New Jersey, which rejected incorporation of the 
privilege against the states in 1908, described it as “universal in American 
law . . . [,] a protection to the innocent though a shelter to the guilty, and a 
safeguard against heedless, unfounded, or tyrannical prosecutions.”101
Although the Court concluded the privilege is not sufficiently fundamental 
to be incorporated through due process, the Court nonetheless recognized it 
as “a just and useful principle of law.”102 Far from being an aberrational 
departure from contrary baseline rules, in other words, the arguments of 
Murphy and Miranda draw on a line of precedent that declared and sought 
Looking at the doctrine as thus established, it would seem plainly to be 
deducible that as the principle from which, under the law of nature, it was 
held that one accused could not be compelled to testify against himself, 
was in its essence comprehensive enough to exclude all manifestations of 
compulsion, whether arising from torture or from moral causes, the rule 
formulating the principle with logical accuracy, came to be so stated as to 
embrace all cases of compulsion which were covered by the doctrine.  As 
the facts by which compulsion might manifest itself, whether physical or 
moral, would be necessarily ever different, the measure by which the 
involuntary nature of the confession was to be ascertained was stated in 
the rule, not by the changing causes, but by their resultant effect upon the 
mind . . . .
Id. at 548.
100 Id. at 562.  Three justices dissented.
101 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
102 Id. at 107.  In rejecting incorporation, the Court reasoned that (1) the privilege was 
insufficiently recognized as a matter of British and American history in the founding era, 
see id. at 102-09, (2) of all the rights litigants had claimed should apply at civil or criminal 
trials as a matter of due process – including trial by jury – the Court had at that time only 
found two: the court should have jurisdiction and the parties should have notice and the 
opportunity to be heard, see id. at 110-11, and (3) there is disagreement over the value of 
the privilege and in any event “it cannot be ranked with [“immutable principle[s] of 
justice” such as] the right to hearing before condemnation, the immunity from arbitrary 
power not acting by general laws, and the inviolability of private property,” id. at 113.  The 
second reason suggests a trial right interpretation, but only the third reason hints at 
disagreement with the privilege itself, and the Court was careful not to endorse the 
“doubt[s]” about the value of the privilege that it traced to “the days of Bentham.”  Id.  
Rather, the Court suggested that the privilege “is best defended not as an unchangeable 
principle of universal justice but as a law proved by experience to be expedient.”  Id.  In 
dissent, the first Justice Harlan relied on Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-33, as support for 
incorporation.
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to justify an expansive privilege.103
Importantly, however, the Warren Court cases also provide an
alternate approach.  In a series of dissents, Justice Harlan agreed that the 
privilege is a set of “basic principles capable of expansion” depending on 
the Court’s “policy choices.”104 But Justice Harlan urged a more focused 
and pragmatic balancing of interests in place of the broad generalities of 
Murphy.  The policy choice, he said, must recognize “the essential tension 
that springs from the uncertain mandate which this provision of the 
Constitution gives to this Court.”105  Thus, the Court must balance “the 
history and purposes of the privilege [with] the character and urgency of the 
other public interests involved.”106 Proponents of an expanded privilege 
must make a “powerful showing that [the] new rules are plainly desirable in 
the context of our society . . . before those rules are engrafted onto the 
Constitution.”107  Judge Friendly’s criticism of the Warren Court’s privilege 
103 At least three caveats are also worth noting.  First, although the privilege long has been 
celebrated, the celebration has never been unanimous.  Thus, in Palko v. Connecticut, 
Justice Cardozo suggested doubts about the need for the privilege as a trial right while also 
endorsing constitutional limits on custodial interrogation:
[The privilege] might be lost, and justice still be done.  Indeed, today as in 
the past there are students of our penal system who look upon the 
immunity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its 
scope or destroy it altogether.  No doubt there would remain the need to 
give protection against torture, physical or mental.  Justice, however, 
would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to 
orderly inquiry.
302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (citations omitted); see also Twining, 211 U.S. at 113 (“The 
wisdom of the exemption has never been universally assented to since the days of 
Bentham; many doubt it to-day”).  Second, these dissenting views ensured that 
incorporation of the privilege against the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), 
would be controversial.  For some, at least, it remains so today.  See Dripps, Against, supra 
note 85 (suggesting “disincorporation”).  Third, celebration of the privilege in older cases 
does not justify the privilege by itself.  See Friendly, supra note 85, at 679 (arguing rhetoric 
like that quoted in the text amounts to “eloquent phrases . . . accepted as a substitute for 
thorough thought”).  Yet these celebrations deserve more consideration than they 
commonly receive from critics of the privilege.  See infra notes 198-218 and accompanying 
text.
104 Id. at 511 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
105 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 450 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Murphy, 
378 U.S. at 81 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Almost entirely absent from the 
statement of ‘policies’ is any reference to the particular problem of this case; at best, the 
statement suggests the set of values which are on one side of the issue.”).
106 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 523 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
107 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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cases sounded similar themes.108 Under this analysis, the privilege is more 
than a criminal trial right, but only when circumstances warrant its 
expansion.
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court signaled a third 
approach that rejected, not just Murphy, but any expansive view of the 
privilege.  Writing for the Court in a case about the extraterritorial 
application of the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist paused “to 
note that it operates in a different manner than the Fifth Amendment, which 
is not at issue in this case.”109  He explained that “[t]he privilege against 
self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants.  
Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately 
impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.”110
The Verdugo-Urquidez dictum draws on several sources.  First, of 
course, is a reading of the text that limits  the privilege to trial proceedings.  
Second, perhaps, is a sense that the balance of policies advocated by Justice 
Harlan weighs clearly against an expansive privilege.  Third, the facts of 
many self-incrimination cases present issues of admissibility.  In these 
cases, the Court is, of necessity, discussing the application of the privilege 
at trial and so it is an easy step to describe the privilege as only a trial right.  
Moreover, some earlier cases contain language that arguably described the 
privilege as only a trial right.  Thus, in Oregon v. Elstad, the Court said that 
“the prosecution has actually violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
rights” when it “introduce[s] an inadmissible confession at trial.”111
Whatever the source for Chief Justice Rehnquist’s assertion, Martinez has 
no Fifth Amendment complaint under the trial right approach – indeed, no 
one whose testimony is compelled in any way, even without a grant of 
immunity, has cause to complain under the privilege so long as the
testimony is not introduced at a criminal trial.
The most recent case to address these issues in any detail before 
Chavez was United States v. Balsys, but Balsys simply muddied the waters.  
108 See Friendly, supra note 85, at 679-98; see also HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS
266-84 (1967).
109 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).  
110 494 U.S. at 264.  Because the privilege was not at issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
words were dicta, but later decisions have cited the statement as the foundation for limiting 
the scope of the privilege.  See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (quoting 
Verdugo-Urquidez to describe the privilege as “”a fundamental trial right’”).  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist cited Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972), as support for the 
claim that a violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs only at trial.  As I explain at infra
note 192, however, a fair reading of Kastigar does not support that claim.
111 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985); see also id. at 306-07 (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits its 
use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony.”).
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Justice Souter’s majority opinion declares that the Self-Incrimination 
Clause “provide[s] a witness with the right against compelled self-incrimin-
ation when reasonably fearing prosecution by the government whose power 
the Clause limits.”112  This language seems to treat the privilege as a right 
extending beyond the criminal trial.  Yet the Court refused to take that step; 
instead it cited the contrary statement in Verdugo-Urquidez and merely 
“assum[ed], arguendo” that the privilege creates more than a trial right.113
Similarly, the Court explicitly rejected Murphy’s expansive view of the 
privilege but did not reject the idea that the scope of the privilege turns on 
policy assessments.  To the contrary, the Court said that Murphy’s flaw was 
not the use of policy analysis but simply the failure “to weigh the host of 
competing policy concerns that would be raised in a legitimate 
reconsideration of the Clause’s scope.”114  Thus, Balsys gestures 
simultaneously in the direction of Justice Harlan and Verdugo-Urquidez –
hardly a position of stability.
If the text provides no answer and precedent points in inconsistent 
directions, then perhaps the solutions of other commentators will point the 
true path.  Two recent articles, however, suggest otherwise.  First, Susan 
Klein describes the privilege against self-incrimination as a trial right but 
argues it “can be protected only by applying the privilege in any pretrial 
setting where questioning may elicit an incriminating response.”115
Importantly, Klein does not explicitly say that the privilege applies as a 
right in these situations; instead she adopts the argument, set out in 
Michigan v. Tucker, that “an inability to protect the right at one stage of a 
proceeding may make its invocation useless at a later stage.”116
Nonetheless, she insists that compelled incrimination in any of these 
“pretrial settings” should be treated as a constitutional violation meriting 
“injunctive and other relief.”117
Yet Klein stands on disputed ground with her insistence that 
112 524 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).  At issue in Balsys was whether a witness in a domestic 
proceeding may invoke the privilege for fear that any incriminating testimony may be used 
in a foreign prosecution.  By a 7-2 vote, the Court answered no.  For discussion of Balsys, 
see Diane Marie Amann, International Decision – United States v. Balsys, 92 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 759 (1998).  For discussion of the privilege in international criminal law, see Diane 
Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in an 
International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201 (1998).
113 Id. at 691 n.12 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264).
114 Id. at 691.
115 Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1341.
116 417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974).  The Tucker Court, however, described the ability to assert 
the privilege outside the criminal trial as a “right.”  See id. at 440.
117 Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1341.
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disregard of the privilege outside a criminal trial can violate the 
Constitution if the privilege itself is only a trial right.  True, the best way to 
protect the privilege may be to allow its invocation outside the trial, but that 
reasoning simply mirrors the reasoning of Miranda, which imposed “proper 
safeguards” to guarantee the core right.118  Klein’s analysis, in other words, 
puts us into the same uncertain terrain of constitutional common law and 
prophylactic rules that Miran da inhabits, and she freely admits her 
willingness to go there.119 In her view, which is well-argued and nuanced, 
quasi-constitutional prophylactic rules are not theoretically troubling and –
perhaps more important – such rules are simply a necessary part of 
constitutional adjudication.120  Although Klein is plainly correct that 
prophylactic rules are part of contemporary constitutional interpretation, her 
argument gives insufficient attention to whether there is really any 
difference between prophylactic rules and other constitutional law.
Second, Steven Clymer argues that the privilege against self-
incrimination is a trial right that bars admission of compelled testimony.121
He also argues that the Constitution requires the privilege to be available in 
non-criminal contexts.  The crucial point, he insists, is that no constitutional 
violation exists until the government attempts to use a compelled statement 
at trial.122 Yet the argument in support of this conclusion is a sleight of 
hand. If the privilege may be asserted in non-criminal settings, but the right 
not to incriminate oneself is violated only at trial, then there is no self-
incrimination violation if the government ignores assertion of the privilege
prior to trial.  Witnesses can invoke the privilege until they are blue in the 
face, but that invocation will be meaningless unless a trial follows.  In the 
meantime, the government is free to compel statements because the 
compulsion – by itself – does not violate the Constitution (subject, of 
course, to possible due process constraints).  What, then, does the 
118 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
119 See Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1351-52 (arguing Miranda is constitutional 
common law); see also Klein, Deconstitutionalized, supra note 55, at 481-88 (same); 
Klein, Identifying, supra note 38, at 1032-33, 1037-44 (defining and providing examples of 
“constitutional prophylactic rules”).
120 See id. at 1034-35.
121 See Clymer, supra note 63, at 449-50.
122 See id. at 459-65, 492-93.  Clymer thus echoes Akhil Amar.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, 
THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 206-207 n.55 (1997) (“it is this 
introduction [of a compelled statement] that violates the Fifth Amendment”).  Although I 
am critical of Clymer’s trial right analysis, he is undoubtedly correct that the trial right 
view is logical and has substantial support among the justices.  I agree, moreover, with his 
assertion that, if the privilege is ultimately a rule of admissibility, then we should at least 
give it real force rather than create exceptions that undermine its effectiveness.  See also
Loewy, supra note 63, at 927-28 (taking a similar approach to Miranda).
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Constitution really require outside the criminal trial?
Clymer may be suggesting the existence of a constitutional right 
without a remedy.  Or, he could mean that the ability to raise the privilege 
outside a criminal trial is something less than a right.  Perhaps it is a 
“safeguard” based on the policy choice that it is better to allow the privilege 
in non-criminal proceedings than to undermine the trial right.  If that is true, 
then Clymer and Klein end up in similar ter ritory, although both might deny 
it:  any rule that goes beyond prohibition of compelled testimony in a 
criminal trial is a prophylactic safeguard, enforceable for Klein but 
apparently not for Clymer.
Klein’s and Clymer’s arguments bring us back to the Chavez
plurality, which showed the same concern for distinguishing between the 
core constitutional right and prophylactic rules, albeit with less nuance than 
Klein and less sleight of hand than Clymer.
B. Prophylactic Rules and Self- Incrimination
Justice Thomas’s opinion follows Verdugo -Urquidez to reach the 
same conclusion as Clymer:  the privilege is a trial right, so that it cannot be 
violated unless and until a compelled statement is “admitted as testimony . . 
. in a criminal case.”123 But he quickly went beyond Clymer’s analysis.  
Justice Thomas admitted that precedent allows assertion of the privilege in 
“non-criminal cases” unless immunity is granted, but he insisted that 
granting immunity is merely a “prophylactic rule[] designed to safeguard 
the core constitutional right protected by the Self-Incrimination clause.”124
In other words, nothing in the Constitution requires grants of immunity or 
allows assertion of the privilege outside the criminal process; the Court has 
simply developed these rules to ensure that the constitutional right is 
protected.  These rules do not, however, “extend the scope of the 
constitutional right itself, just as violations of judicially crafted prophylactic 
rules do not violate the constitutional rights of any person.”125
Indeed, Justice Thomas signaled some openness to going farther.  
His asserted that the privilege applies as a constitutional matter only “when 
a ‘criminal case’ commences” but refused to specify when that happens –
except to say that “at the very least [it] requires the initiation of legal 
123 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2001 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2002 (“Mere coercion does 
not violate the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements 
in a criminal case against the witness”); id. at 2003 (“a violation of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against 
himself in a criminal case”) (emphasis original).
124 Id. at 2002-03.
125 Id. at 2003.
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proceedings.”126  How, then, should we treat a grand jury proceeding?  It is 
a legal proceeding, but one could plausibly maintain that a “criminal case” 
does not begin until the filing of formal charges.127  If that is true, then 
under Justice Thomas’s analysis, the privilege does not apply in grand jury 
proceedings as a matter of constitutional right.
Justice Thomas’s opinion provides additional support for that 
interpretation.  He noted that the government can compel witnesses to 
testify at trial or before a grand jury if they are not targets, and that they can 
be compelled even if they are targets so long as they receive immunity.  
Yet, he never described the receipt of immunity as a right; instead, it is 
merely “well-established” by “case law.”128  Moreover, in the same 
paragraph, he observed that government employees may be compelled to 
testify on pain of losing their jobs only if they receive immunity, and he 
described that protection as a prophylactic rule.129  The structure of this 
paragraph of the opinion seems to exhibit a purposeful ambiguity.  It tends 
to the conclusion that all immunity is prophylactic, but it stops short of 
saying so in plain words.
Unlike Clymer, then, Justice Thomas developed and embraced the 
logical conclusions of the trial right argument.  The Constitution clearly 
requires only suppression of compelled statements at trial.  Most of the
remaining doctrine, perhaps even all of it, is prophylactic.  Importantly, 
moreover – and here Justice Thomas diverges from Klein – prophylactic 
rules are necessarily non-constitutional rules. Indeed, assuming Justice 
Thomas still holds to the tenets of Justice Scalia’s Dickerson dissent –
which he joined – Congress can modify or reject prophylactic rules 
126 Id. at 2000-01.
127 The beginning of a criminal case varies with the perspective of the people involved and 
the context in which the question is asked.  The best definition might include grand jury 
proceedings, but the filing of formal charges by the prosecution is clearly a defensible 
choice as well.  For a variety of perspectives, see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 
563 (1892) (“A criminal prosecution under article 6 of the amendments is much narrower 
than a ‘criminal case,’ under article 5 of the amendments.  It is entirely consistent with the 
language of article 5, that the privilege of not being a witness against himself is to be 
exercised in a proceeding before a grand jury.”); Fellers v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1019, 
1022 (2004) (“The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered at or after the time that 
judicial proceedings have been initiated . . . whether by way of formal charge, preliminary 
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2003) (holding the term 
“criminal proceedings” includes grand jury proceedings for purposes of the material 
witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144); AMAR, supra note 122, at 221-22 (arguing a criminal 
case begins with the filing of charges against the defendant).
128 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2001 (plurality opinion).
129 See id. at 2002 & n.2.
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precisely because they are not constitutional.130
In short, Justice Thomas categorized the doctrine of requiring
immunity for compelled self-incrimination in non-criminal cases – and 
perhaps even in some criminal proceedings – as a non-constitutional rule
subject to congressional oversight.  This assertion is literally unprecedented.  
Before Chavez, the Court had insisted that the Constitution requires at least 
use and derivative-use immunity in exchange for compelled, incriminating 
testimony.  Thus, in Kastigar v. United States, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the federal use immunity statute.  If immunity were 
simply a prophylactic doctrine, the result would have been obvious –
Congress could adopt whatever immunity statute it desired, including a 
statute providing for no immunity.  But the Court said that the existence of 
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination required a 
“constitutional inquiry” into “whether the immunity granted under this 
statute is coextensive with the scope of the privilege.”131  If the immunity 
statute was not “as comprehensive as the protection afforded by the 
privilege, petitioners were justified in refusing to answer.”132 Put 
differently, persons from whom the government seeks to compel 
incriminating testimony have a constitutional right to silence or immunity in 
equal amounts.  Numerous cases before and after Kastigar also characterize 
immunity in civil and criminal proceedings as a constitutional right.133
130 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 445-47, 454 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  The Court’s power to craft such rules, on the other hand, is far more troubling 
to Justices Scalia and Thomas.  See id. at 454, 457-461; see also Joseph D. Grano, 
Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure, A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. 
L. REV. 100 (1985); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to 
Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 (1988).  Cf. Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and 
Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 25 (2001) (suggesting the 
word “prophylactic” “inappropriately raises concerns of legitimacy where none should 
exist”).
131 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972); see also id. at 453.
132 Id. at 449.
133 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000) (stating “the scope of the ‘use and 
derivative-use’ immunity that [the federal immunity statute] provides is coextensive with 
the scope of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination”); Minnesota v. Murphy, 
465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (“It has long been held that [the privilege against self-
incrimination] not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal 
trial at which he is a defendant, but also ’privileges him not to answer official questions put 
to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers 
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings’ . . . ‘unless and until he is protected 
at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom’”) 
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1973)); Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 
U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983) (characterizing the “Fifth Amendment right” as a claim to silence 
or immunity that exists at the time of questioning, in this case during a civil deposition); 
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Even Michigan v. Tucker insisted that the ability to invoke the privilege 
outside a criminal trial is a “right.”134
While the most striking aspect of the plurality’s analysis is its 
wholesale revision of the immunity doctrine, worth noting as well is that 
Justice Thomas also consigned Miranda to the prophylactic category.  He 
was hardly the first to do so, of course.135  But coming only three years after 
Dickerson asserted Miranda’s constitutional status, the willingness of four 
justices to downgrade it again is surprising and significant.  If Miranda is
prophylactic in the sense that violations of Miranda do not violate the 
Constitution, then the basis for applying Miranda to void a congressional 
statute in Dickerson is elusive at best.136 Indeed, in the same Term it 
decided Dickerson, the Court upheld a statutory departure from what it 
called a prophylactic rule about briefing in potentially frivolous indigent 
criminal appeals.137  If both rules are prophylactic in the sense of going 
beyond what the Constitution requires, then the result should have been the 
same – upholding the statute – in both cases.138
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) (describing the immunity 
requirement as “the constitutional rule”); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 
(1956) (holding the Immunity Act of 1954 “protects a witness who is compelled to answer 
to the extent of his constitutional immunity”); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 
(1892) (striking down the 1868 federal immunity statute in part because it did not “supply a 
complete protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was 
designed to guard, and [was] not a full substitute for that provision”).  See also Kastigar, 
406 U.S. at 449-55 (discussing Counselman, Ul mann, and Murphy).
134 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974). See also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) 
(applying the privilege to suppress a statement made during police interrogation).
135 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 
U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
136 Which was exactly Justice Scalia’s point in Dickerson.  See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 445-
46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  If, however, one believes that prophylactic rules have 
constitutional status as interpretations and applications of the text, then striking down 18 
U.S.C. § 3501 as inconsistent with Miranda was perfectly legitimate.  See Strauss, supra
note 38.
137 Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (limiting the scope of Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967)).
138 Indeed, one would expect the Court to be more likely to reject state deviation from a 
prophylactic rule than federal deviation.  Yet Dickerson struck down a federal deviation, 
while Smith v. Robbins upheld a state deviation.  If both rules are prophylactic, the only 
possible explanation – besides politics – is that the Miranda rule, whether or not 
prophylactic, is also constitutional, while the Anders rule is merely prophylactic.  
Dickerson suggests such an explanation, but neither it nor Smith v. Robbins provides an 
explanation of how we should sort this out, and the Chavez plurality seems to reject the 
distinction entirely.  For a helpful comparison of Dickerson and Smith, see Tracy A. 
Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 
756-59 (2001) [hereinafter Thomas, Remedial Rights].
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Lest readers think I have overstated the plurality’s position, 
remember again what Justice Thomas did not say.  He described the ability 
to assert the privilege outside criminal proceedings, and the corresponding 
entitlement to immunity, as a prophylactic “evidentiary privilege,” but he 
never considered that it might be a rule of constitutional law.  Second, he 
never said clearly that the privilege applies as a matter of constitutional 
right in all criminal proceedings.  Third, Dickerson is entirely absent from 
the opinion, and Miranda is once again a nonconstitutional, prophylactic 
rule.  Certainly, later cases will be able to ignore or distinguish the 
reasoning of the plurality, but a fair reading of Justice Thomas’s opinion 
makes plain that four justices agreed to a dramatic restatement of the 
privilege against self-incrimination and that the other five justices were 
splintered in their response.
IV. MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND PROPHYLACTIC RULES
Many commentators are comfortable, not merely with the idea of 
prophylactic rules that protect constitutional rights by creating a buffer zone 
of prohibited conduct beyond the scope of the actual right, but also with 
prophylactic rules that go beyond core constitutional rights yet are 
themselves enforceable as constitutional law.139  The Chavez plurality, by 
contrast, articulated a more rigid dichotomy between constitutional law and 
non-constitutional, minimally enforceable prophylactic rules subject to 
congressional modification to the same extent as any other form of federal 
common law.
The reason for the plurality’s insistence on a sharp divide, I believe, 
is not just a general concern about the legitimacy of prophylactic rules, but 
also an uncertainty about how to treat constitutional remedies.  This 
problem arises in two contexts.  First, when the Court develops rules that 
“safeguard” a core right – Miranda, of course, being the most notable 
example – these rules can be seen as simply protective remedies and not 
actual constitutional requirements.  Second, whenever the Court discusses 
139 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 38; David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently:
Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 
31, 56; Klein, Identifying, supra note 38; Schulhofer, Reconsidering, supra note 87, at 448-
51; Strauss, supra note 38; see also Caminker, supra note 130 (suggesting the word 
“prophylactic” should be discarded but embracing the general approach to constitutional 
law that prophylactic rules represent); Clymer, supra note 63 (appearing to be comfortable 
with non-constitutional rules but less certain about their enforceability); Michael C. Dorf & 
Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 73 n.47
(“Most of the academic literature accepts the legitimacy of prophylaxis, with the debate 
focusing on how to justify it.”).
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the contours of a constitutional right, it must also consider how that right 
will be applied and in particular how to remedy violations of that right.  
It is tempting to think of remedies and rights as different things.  
Evan Caminker suggests, for example, that “there is commonly some 
slippage between rights and the doctrinal rules that enforce those rights.”140
Against this slippage, we might insist that the right remains inviolable – the 
only true constitutional rule – even as courts under- or over-enforce it.141
Indeed, the concern that prophylactic rules over-enforce the Constitution 
could be a critical factor for the justices in the Chavez plurality, who may 
equate over-enforcement with undesirable judicial activism.
As constitutional scholars have begun to realize, however – and as 
generations of private law scholars have recognized – rights and remedies 
do not exist in separate, sealed environments.  Remedies help define the 
scope of a right.  And if rights are things that have value, then surely a large 
part of their value is the remedies that are available for violations of those 
rights.142  Finally, not only does enforcement of a right require the crafting 
of some remedy, but concerns about the appropriateness of various 
remedies can shape the scope of a right.143  Justice Harlan’s Fifth 
140 Caminker, supra note 130, at 28; see also Jeffries, Right-Remedy, supra note 28 
(exploring and justifying gaps between rights and remedies in civil rights litigation).
141 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (suggesting the Court underenforces 
constitutional norms that should nonetheless be considered binding to their “full conceptual 
boundaries”); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term – Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975) (suggesting some decisions –
including Miranda – go beyond what the Constitution requires and should be considered 
constitutional common law subject to congressional modification or override).
142 As Susan Bandes put it, “By definition, a right must be enforceable.  What would be the 
measure of a right whose transgression carried no penalty?  It would look more like a hope, 
or a request, than a guarantee.”  Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing 
Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 306 (1995).
143 Daryl Levinson summarizes the point in this way:
Constitutional rights do not, in fact, emerge fully formed from abstract 
interpretation of constitutional text, structure, and history, or from 
philosophizing about constitutional values.  The rights-essentialist 
picture, in which courts begin with the pure, Platonic ideal of a 
constitutional right and only then pragmatically apply the right through 
the vehicles of implementation and remediation, bears little resemblance 
to the actual judicial practice of rights-construction. . . . [C]onstitutional 
rights are inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial concerns.  
Constitutional adjudication is functional not just at the level of remedies, 
but all the way up.  [In the structural reform context, moreover,] rights 
and remedies are redefined in an iterated process that often stretches out 
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Amendment dissents and Justice Souter’s opinion in Chavez seem to 
recognize the validity of this point.
Both sides of this debate score important points.  The “cash value” 
of a right is critical to any realistic definition or understanding of its 
meaning.  Yet rights surely are more than the sum of their enforcement; the 
articulation of constitutional norms beyond the context of available 
remedies may modify behaviors and serve valuable civic, political, and 
precedential purposes.144 So, too, the withholding or granting of remedies 
can serve institutional and systemic goals that judges legitimately may 
consider.145
Rights and remedies, then, are linked.  When a court articulates and 
applies a norm, the entire process gives meaning to the claimed right.146
over a number of years in an effort to achieve concrete changes in public 
institutions.
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 873-74 (1999).  David Cole concludes his discussion of “the inextricable relationship 
between rights and remedies” with the following observation:
If right and remedy cannot easily be divided, then Congress’s “remedial” 
measures are just as likely to affect the substantive scope of the right at 
issue as the Court’s “substantive” interpretations are likely to determine 
the remedies available.  Thus, it may be impossible to draw the line the 
Court asserts.  If the remedial/substantive distinction cannot be 
maintained in practice, the fact that it might be defended as a theoretical 
matter is not of much significance.
Cole, supra note 139, at 67.  Tracy Thomas is more concise: “Prophylactics are not rules; 
they are remedies.  A remedy is an intrinsic component of every legal ‘right.’”  Tracy A. 
Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. 
Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 363 (2002) [hereinafter Thomas, Looking Glass]; 
see also Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 138.  For articles that laid the groundwork 
for these claims, see Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal 
Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735 (1992), and Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 
YALE L.J. 585 (1983).
144 See Levinson, supra note 143, at 905-11; cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Freedom from 
Unreal Loyalties”: On Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1773 (1997) (insisting the Constitution is legitimate only if held to its textual promise of 
equal protection of the laws while also insisting the Constitution as it exists in practice 
validates enormous amounts of inequality).
145 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term – Foreword: Implementing 
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 28, at 1787-
91; Jeffries, Disaggregating, supra note 63, at 279-81.
146 See Levinson, supra note 143, at 857; Thomas, Looking Glass, supra note 143, at 371 
(arguing “rights are comprised of two key components: the inert skeletal matter of the 
substantive guarantee and the operative lifeblood of the remedy”).  Evan Caminker seems 
to make essentially the same point when he says, 
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Moreover, the creation and assessment of remedies is a core judicial 
function.147 And, as Susan Klein and David Strauss have powerfully 
shown, prophylactic rules (and remedies) are an inescapable part of 
constitutional adjudication.148 Finally, as Evan Caminker nicely explains
(using Miranda and the due process involuntary confession doctrine as his 
examples), even if we could discern a correct constitutional norm, we could 
never apply that rule in a way that would generate a precisely correct result 
in every case.149 Nearly all constitutional interpretation consists of
approximations. 
The crucial step is how to deal with these insights.  We could vow to 
do better in our efforts to interpret and apply a “real” but always elusive 
Constitution.  The better course, I think, is not to treat imprecision and 
approximation as a loss.  The Constitution is less a theoretical treatise than 
it is a charter of government that we put into practice.150 That practice, in 
turn, means not just the articulation of general norms but also the effort to 
make those norms concrete.  If putting the Constitution into practice 
inevitably generates imprecision, we should accept that imprecision, at least 
most of the time, as the real thing – that is, as the Constitution.  Thus I 
quibble with, for example, Richard Fallon’s statement that “the Court often 
must craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but does not reflect 
the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”151  If the meaning of the Constitution 
is so elusive in individual cases that we cannot discern or apply it with any 
precision, then we must consider the possibility – indeed, we must accept –
Judicial implementation of constitutional rights requires two major steps.  
First, the Supreme Court must interpret the Constitution to identify the 
constitutional norm relevant to resolving a given dispute. . . . The second 
step is for the Supreme Court to translate further that conception of a 
constitutional right or duty into a more specific and workable set of 
doctrinal rules that can feasibly be applied to safeguard that right or 
enforce that duty in specific cases.
Caminker, supra note 130, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
147 See Fallon, supra note 145, at 57 (“A crucial mission of the Court is to implement the 
Constitution successfully.”).  Indeed, a federal court lacks jurisdiction over a case if no 
judicial remedy is available.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 
83, 102-09 (1998); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 138, at 689-90.
148 See Klein, Identifying, supra note 38; Strauss, supra note 38; see also Dorf & Friedman, 
supra note 139, at 76 n.60 (equating the issues surrounding prophylactic rules in 
constitutional law with issues raised by constitutional remedies); Thomas, Looking Glass, 
supra note 143, at 363 (“Prophylactics are not rules; they are remedies.”).
149 See Caminker, supra note 130, at 8-20, 26-27.
150 Cf. Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1492 
(1996) (emphasizing the idea that law is a practice in time).
151 Fallon, supra note 145, at 57.  
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that the Constitution does not have a precise meaning.  The tools we 
develop to reach results in individual cases – including prophylactic rules –
do not serve simply to implement imperfectly a precise constitutional 
meaning.  Rather, these tools, together with the results of individual cases, 
are the meaning of the Constitution.152  Once we are able to recognize the 
Constitution that we have  in practice, we will be in a better position to 
achieve the Constitution that we theorize about.153
Several conclusions follow from these points.  First, the rigid 
distinction between constitutional rights and a lesser category of 
prophylactic rules and remedies is insupportable.  Second, prophylactic 
rules and remedies have a constitutional dimension because of their role in 
shaping constitutional meaning.  Third, nearly all prophylactic rules are 
constitutional law in the most meaningful sense of constraining government 
conduct and providing remedies to injured individuals.  Perhaps we can 
conceive of two levels of prophylactics – constitutional prophylactics and 
garden-variety prophylactics – but I do not know how we would tell the 
difference between the two unless it turned on whether Congress may 
change the rules in the second category but not in the first.  Yet then one
category of prophylactic rules would be indistinguishable from the rest of 
constitutional law.  As I already have argued, I see little value in such a 
distinction.154
152 Or at least a large part of constitutional meaning – as I have admitted, the articulation of 
imprecise constitutional norms has value independent from the focus on concrete results.  
At first blush, my claim seems similar to the Court’s statement in Cooper v. Aaron that its 
interpretations of the Constitution are as much the supreme law of the land as the text of 
the Constitution itself.  358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).  The similarity holds to the extent the Court 
meant to say that its interpretations of the Constitution are the Constitution.  After all, the 
text must be interpreted to be applied, and it acquires meaning only from the process of 
interpretation.  See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) 
(arguing that legal indeterminacy reflects social plurality, with the result that constitutional 
interpretation should be a dialogue of continuous renewal and revision).  As will become 
clear, however, I do not believe that this position leads to a conclusion of judicial 
exclusivity in constitutional interpretation.
153 Thus, my position, while admittedly reductive, is not a “crude positivism” that makes 
the remedy the only thing of importance.  See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 
1055 (2004).  Remedies reveal much of the real world value and meaning of rights, so 
much so that we cannot talk about rights in any concrete way without taking remedies into 
account.  Sabel & Simon’s article provides an excellent example.  Their recognition of the 
importance of remedies and of remedial discretion leads them to reconceptualize the basic 
rights claim of public law litigation as one of destabilization.  See id. at 1055-56.
154 Indeed, some commentators come close to saying that all constitutional doctrine is 
prophylactic in the sense that it seeks to implement an elusive or abstract constitutional 
meaning.  For example, Caminker demonstrates that the due process involuntary 
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If rights, remedies, and prophylactic rules are all part of 
constitutional meaning, then it also seems inevitable that Congress has a 
role in defining what the Constitution means.  Congress can modify the 
remedies available for violations of constitutional rights.155  If remedies 
help to define rights, then Congress also has some power to define 
constitutional rights.  Moreover, if the Constitution does not have a precise 
meaning, courts have less room to claim exclusive authority over 
constitutional interpretation because the existence of imprecision – even 
after the courts rule – confirms that other outcomes would be equally 
consistent with reasonable views of what the Constitution requires.  Put 
differently, imprecision suggests that, as an institutional matter, courts often 
will not be able to provide precise interpretations of the Constitution and 
may not even be able to provide the best interpretation in every case.156 If 
so, then if Congress stays within the scope of reasonable disagreement 
confession test is just as prophylactic as the Miranda warnings that have partly displaced it, 
because “both are instrumental devices designed to safeguard constitutional values.”  
Caminker, supra note 130, at 26-27.  Describing doctrine in this way supports my point.  
Few would suggest that Supreme Court constitutional interpretation is illegitimate simply 
because the resulting doctrine is almost always prophylactic in this sense.  Similarly, few 
would contend that Congress may displace all constitutional doctrine because it is 
prophylactic.  Rather, because constitutional meaning is necessarily imprecise, there is 
always a sense in which interpretation and doctrine are prophylactic by virtue of being 
approximations, but these approximations are usually all we have of the Constitution in 
practice.
155 Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 
(allowing damages action based on the Constitution), with Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 
296 (1983) (barring a Bivens claim in military context where statutory remedies were 
arguably available); see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (upholding Prison Litigation 
Reform Act‘s limitations on injunctive relief in litigation over the constitutionality of 
prison conditions); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (holding the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act requires federal court deference to reasonable interpretations 
of constitutional law by state courts); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
73-76 (1996) (holding Congress can create remedies that displace the action recognized in 
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 
(1966) (holding Congress has broad discretion to fashion remedies for unconstitutional 
uses of literacy tests as a prerequisite for voting). 
156 For discussions of institutional constraints on constitutional interpretation by the Court 
and Congress, see Cole, supra note 139, at 59-71, Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-
Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 40-
43 (2000) (focusing on areas of relative executive advantage), Michael W. McConnell, 
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
153 (1997), Sager, supra note 141, MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY 
FROM THE COURTS 95-128 (1999).  For the best recent statement in support of judicial 
exclusivity in constitutional interpretation (or, at least, in support of giving the Courts the 
exclusive last word on what is constitutional), see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, 
On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
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created by the necessary imprecision of putting the Constitution into 
practice, courts should hesitate before substituting their own views.157
Worth remembering here is that the Constitution has always meant 
more than what the courts say it means.158  Congress has broad power to 
interpret the Constitution in its daily practice of implementing the document 
through legislation and other actions.  The executive branch, too, has some 
independent power to “say what the law is” and thus engages in 
constitutional interpretation.159 Notwithstanding its periodic insistence on 
157 For purposes of this article, I am relatively agnostic on whether the states also have this 
power.  See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (allowing California to adopt a less 
restrictive procedure than the one set out in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 38 (1967) for 
determining whether an indigent’s criminal appeal is frivolous); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (inviting “Congress and the States” to develop alternative safeguards 
for the privilege against self-incrimination) (emphasis added).  Compare Michael C. Dorf, 
The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60-69 (1998) (suggesting the 
Supreme Court should engage in provisional adjudication that allows state experimentation 
with constitutional doctrine); Dorf & Friedman, supra note 139, at 103-06 (suggesting state 
legislatures should have the same power as Congress to craft protections for constitutional 
rights that depart from the Miranda warnings but are adequate to protect Fifth Amendment 
rights).  My focus here is separation of powers.  That said, there is a significant difference 
between allocating the power to interpret the constitution within the federal government, 
and sharing that power with the states.  Although I am not concerned if states have some 
power to change constitutional meaning – uniformity is not an overriding goal in general, 
see Dorf, supra, at 65-67; Mark Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical 
Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129 
(1999); Mark V. Tushnet, Scalia and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Foolish 
Formalism?, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1734 (1991) – at the end of the day we should 
preserve overall federal supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
158 Also worth remembering is that the Court rarely stands fast against majoritarian views.  
See Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347 (2003) (making 
this point and collecting supporting materials); cf. Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal 
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003) (making a roughly 
similar argument about aspects of the Court’s interaction with non-judicial actors); but see
Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, “Orderly 
Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups”, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 503, 510 (2003) (suggesting statistics demonstrate the Court’s “increasing 
aggressiveness . . . in reviewing federal statutes”).  This point generates a potential 
objection to my analysis: why do we need to give Congress a formal role in making 
constitutional law when it usually gets what it wants anyway?  At least a partial answer is 
that Congress already has a formal role through the creation and modification of remedies, 
and we need to confront this power seriously rather than maintain the pretense of judicial 
exclusivity.
159 For discussions of coordinate branch authority to interpret the Constitution, see LOUIS 
FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2001); 
Johnsen, supra note 156; Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial 
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judicial exclusivity, the Court, too, has accepted the authority of the 
political branches to interpret the Constitution.  For example, McCulloch v. 
Maryland160 adopted a deferential view of Congress’s ability to interpret its 
own powers – although recent cases have made clear that the Court intends 
to police those limits to some degree.161 The tiers of equal protection 
review similarly give state and federal legislatures room in most instances 
to decide for themselves what actions are appropriate under the 
Constitution, so long as they stay within the bounds of reasonableness.162
Consider, too, Nixon v. United States, in which the Court ruled that the 
political question doctrine disabled it from hearing a claim that the Senate’s 
interpretation of its power to “try all Impeachments” was 
unconstitutional.163  As a result, the Senate’s interpretation of what the 
Constitution requires in an impeachment trial is final and conclusive. 164
Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 924-25 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L. J. 217 (1994).
160 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  For a consistent discussion of 
the Court’s history of deferring to Congress’s constitutional judgment, see Robert C. Post 
& Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on 
Section 5 Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 30-40 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Protecting].
162 This view of legislative activity finds particular resonance in Sager’s emphasis on the 
institutional constraints that prevent federal courts from enforcing constitutional rights to 
their full extent, with the result that legislatures are left with the responsibility to give effect 
to constitutional norms.  Where I differ from Sager is in describing the proper force of 
these norms.  For Sager, they represent the “full conceptual boundaries” of the 
Constitution.  See Sager, supra note 141, at 1213.  To some extent, his claim is indisputable 
– the Constitution can be read to support norms that go beyond existing doctrine.  I would 
argue, however, that these norms are at best arguments until a court or legislature turns 
them into rights.  Cf. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1606 
(1986), reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT 
COVER 203, 210 (Martha Minow, et al. eds., 1993) (“it is precisely this embedding of an 
understanding of political text in institutional modes of action that distinguishes legal 
interpretation from the interpretation of literature, from political philosophy, and from 
constitutional criticism”).
163 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (refusing to decide the meaning of U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 3, cl. 6).
164 For an insightful discussion of the inverse correlation between the strength of the 
political question doctrine and strong theories of judicial review, see Rachel E. Barkow, 
More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of 
Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002).  Another example of this link comes 
from Rebecca Brown’s criticism of Nixon for threatening the separation of powers (and 
resulting protections of individual liberty) by undermining judicial review.  See Rebecca L. 
Brown, When Political Rights Affect Individual Rights, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125.  The 
alternative view of cases like Nixon, and of political questions generally, is that the Court 
does not intervene because, in fact, there has been no violation of the Constitution.  See
Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); see also
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Justice Jackson’s influential concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer also supports extrajudicial constitutional 
interpretation.165 To assess the constitutionality of President Truman’s 
seizure of the steel mills, Justice Jackson suggested three categories of 
executive action.  For the first category, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant 
to an express or implied authorization of Congress,”166 he asserted that 
executive action should be “supported by the strongest of presumptions and 
the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”167  In other words, if Con gress 
and the President agree that the President should have a particular power, 
the Court rarely should intrude with a contrary view.  The necessary result 
of this inquiry is to leave the political branches with a presumptive last 
word in most cases on the extent of presidential power, at least when they
agree.168
Finally, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments give Congress 
the power to “enforce” their provisions “by appropriate legislation.”169  In 
the Voting Rights Act, Congress used this power to prohibit state voting 
practices that the Court had ruled were constitutional – that is, practices that 
did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth amendments – thus raising the 
Brown, supra, at 132 n.33, 153 n.106 (endorsing Henkin’s views). This approach, in other 
words, requires us to wink at the Court’s purported reasoning and to substitute a “real” 
interpretation that portrays the Court as engaged in judicial review rather than deference to 
the constitutional interpretation of another branch.  Although there is great value in figuring 
out “what’s really going on” in Supreme Court decisions, that kind of analysis should not 
distract us from also taking the Court’s articulated reasoning seriously on its own terms.
165 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
166 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
167 Id. at 637.
168 The recognition of shared interpretive authority also emerges from Justice Jackson’s 
second category, which encompasses cases in which “the President acts in absence of either 
a congressional grant or denial of authority [and] can rely only on his own independent 
powers.”  Id.  When reviewing this kind of action, “any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on 
abstract theories of law.”  Id.  If no clear legal rules govern situations like these, the 
President frequently will have the last word on the constitutional scope of his or her power.  
Justice Jackson’s analysis retains its influence.  See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654, 668 (1981) (redefining the categories as “point[s] along a spectrum” rather than “three 
pigeonholes”); see also HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 140 
(1990) (arguing Dames & Moore “inverted” Youngstown “by finding legislative ‘approval’ 
when Congress had given none”).  Whether or not Jackson’s precise analysis is the law 
today, he would have given Congress and the president the last word on executive power in 
many instances, and Dames & Moore follows the same course.
169 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5, amend XV § 2; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 2 
(same enforcement power).
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question of what, exactly, Congress was “enforcing.”170  In South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach,171 Katzenbach v. Morgan,172 and City of Rome v. United 
States,173 the Court nonetheless upheld the Act.  In South Carolina, the 
Court relied on the record compiled by Congress of racial discrimination in 
the use of literacy tests – which turned a permissible practice into a 
violation of the Constitution – and stressed Congress’s discretion in 
choosing an appropriate remedy for this constitutional violation.174 In 
Rome, the Court was careful to assert that Congress had merely created a 
prophylactic remedy.175 In Morgan, however, the Court went further and 
declared that Congress has an independent power to decide on its own what 
constitutes a violation of equal protection, at least so long as it expands the 
right.176
The Court’s more recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores177 can 
be read to repudiate Morgan’s effort to share interpretive power with 
Congress:  Congress cannot “alter[] the meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause” and has no “power to determine what constitutes a constitutional 
violation.”178  Yet the Court admitted that Congress may prohibit states 
from engaging in conduct permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Congress may go beyond the Constitution so long as there is “congruence 
between the means used and the ends to be achieved” and the legislation is 
not “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it 
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.”179 The Court clearly meant to draw a line 
170 Compare Voting Rights Act § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (prohibiting use of literacy tests as a 
prerequisite to enfranchisement), and Voting Rights Act § 5, 79 Stat. at 439 (prohibiting 
voting practices that have the purpose or effect of “denying or abridging the right to vote 
on account of race or color), with Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding only 
changes in voting practices made with the intent to discriminate violate the Constitution), 
and Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (holding literacy tests as a 
prerequisite to voting are constitutional).
171 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
172 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
173 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
174 383 U.S. at 333-34.
175 446 U.S. at 177.
176 384 U.S at 651 n.10, 653-56.
177 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
178 Id. at 519.  See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (questioning Morgan’s 
reasoning).
179 Id. at 530, 532.  As the Court said in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 
(2000), “Congress’ power ‘to enforce’ the Amendment includes the authority both to 
remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat 
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between the power to declare constitutional law and the power to enforce or 
remedy it.  But if remedies are part of the definition of rights, what the 
Court actually said is that Congress can’t go too far in its own 
interpretations of the Constitution.180
The exact scope of Congress’s power to alter remedies remains 
doctrinally unclear, as Boerne and its progeny – including Dickerson –
demonstrate.181  This lack of clarity reflects, in part, the Court’s struggle to 
balance the undeniable remedial authority of Congress against the perceived 
need to limit that power to ensure that Congress cannot use remedies to 
reinterpret the Constitution.  Yet some of this uncertainty may also reflect a 
suspicion that the camel’s nose is already inside the tent: the ability under 
Boerne to craft remedies to deter constitutional violations necessarily 
includes the power to alter the shape of the Constitution in practice.
As a test, Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality” standard 
provides a reasonable approach to defining the scope of Congressional 
power to interpret the Constitution,182 so long as we are careful about 
defining the reference points for this means -ends test.183 If constitutional 
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s 
text.”  The Court described such legislation as “prophylactic.”  Id.; see Nevada Department 
of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003) (same).
180 Compare McConnell, supra note 156, at 184 (arguing legislation is valid under § 5 if it 
is “within a reasonable range of plausible interpretations”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison
and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 459-73 (2000) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal] (arguing 
the better interpretation of Boerne, as applied in Kimel, is that § 5 allows Congress to 
remedy or deter “conduct that would violate the Equal Protection Clause” and forbids 
legislation that is “constitutionally unreasonable or [tends] toward a substantive account of 
the Equal Protection Clause that the Court wishes to suppress”).  Worth noting here is that 
the Court would retain its Marbury power to “say what the law is” because it would have 
the last word on whether Congress went too far.  See Post & Siegel, Equal, supra, at 472.
181 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.  Compare
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (using Boerne to uphold gender discrimination damages claim 
against states), with Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (using Boerne to 
invalidate disability discrimination damages claim against states); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 
(using Boerne to invalidate age discrimination damages claim against states); Florida 
Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (using 
Boerne to invalidate patent infringement damages claim against states).
182 See Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 138, at  733-39 (endorsing the test in general); 
Marci C. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis 
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469 (1999) (same).
183 See Dorf & Friedman, supra note 139, at 90-94 (appearing to approve of the congruence 
and proportionality test so long as it is not too strict); Post & Siegel, Equal, supra note 180, 
at 462 (warning against “the tendency to allow the Boerne test to slide into a kind of 
narrow tailoring”).
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interpretation is inevitably imprecise, the Court should not require too close 
a fit between its interpretation of the Constitution and the interpretation 
reflected in congressional legislation that modifies remedies. Put 
differently, the Court should recognize the imprecision of constitutional 
interpretation and the role that shifting ideas of appropriate remedies play in 
fixing constitutional meaning, as well as institutional issues that may vary 
depending on the constitutional provisions at issue.  As a consequence, 
Congress should have real leeway to modify the perimeter of constitutional 
rights by altering the available remedies.184
As Barry Friedman has suggested, the best way to manage 
imprecision and the accompanying uncertainty about the scope of 
Congress’s role is through an ongoing dialogue between the branches.185
Such a dialogue could create a rough sense of the core and perimeter of 
various constitutional doctrines and implicates a variety of questions and 
concerns.  In light of my concern with the role of remedies in defining 
constitutional interpretation, part of this effort might include the following 
questions:  what remedies are available for violation of a constitutional 
right, and what purposes do those remedies serve?
The second question helps define the core of the constitutional right.  
If we give a remedy with a particular purpose in mind, then the scope of the 
right should encompass at least that purpose.  The answer to the question, of 
course, will rarely be clear.  For example, we generally exclude statements 
obtained in violation of Miranda, but we still must determine whether the 
184 See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 961 (3d ed. 2000) 
(suggesting “it may not make much sense to speak of the meaning of a given constitutional 
provision; one may instead have to talk of a set of plausible meanings, with a different 
subset corresponding to each of the key legal institutions empowered to ascribe meaning to 
the provision for purposes peculiar to that institution’s work”).  Importantly, this approach 
gives Congress room to expand or contract rights under Section 5.  That is to say, there is 
no one-way ratchet in favor of expanding or contracting rights, although institutional 
concerns could be invoked to limit the power of Congress to contract rights in certain 
contexts.  See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (suggesting Congress 
can expand but not contract rights at the margins of constitutional doctrine).   Compare
Cole, supra note 139, at 69-71 (endorsing a version of the “ratchet” theory), and Dorf & 
Friedman, supra note 139, at 90 (arguing Boerne allows a one-way “remedial ratchet”), 
with TRIBE, supra, at 946 (arguing the one-way ratchet ignores the fact that, “[w]hichever 
way Congress turns, it may be increasing the protection afforded to one constitutionally 
recognized right, value, or interest while at the same time decreasing that afforded to 
another”).
185 See Friedman, supra note 143; Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993); see also Post & Siegel, Equal, supra note 180, at 513-22 
(discussing the interaction of Court and Congress in the shaping of equal protection law 
and jurisprudence); Post & Siegel, Protecting, supra note 161, at 25.
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core right is to be free from compulsion, to remain silent, or something else.
The first question also affects the scope of the right but leaves more room 
for contrary legislative judgment about the efficacy and desirability of 
various remedies.  Whether we label it prophylactic, or constitutional 
common law, or perhaps just quasi-constitutional, some level of remedy is
constitutionally necessary in most cases, even though the exact scope of 
remedy is something that Congress may address.186
In sum, prophylactic rules are a legitimate part of constitutional law, 
and in the vast majority of circumstances they are no different from other 
constitutional doctrines.  For that reason, we should consider abandoning 
the term “prophylactic” and the very idea that certain kinds of constitutional 
rules are different from and perhaps less legitimate than others because of 
their scope.  Constitutional interpretation by Court, Congress, or President 
does not give us the Constitution, more or less.187  It gives us all the 
Constitution we have.  Yet the fact that doctrines formerly known as 
prophylactic are now simply constitutional does not insulate them from 
congressional interference.  Through the process of modifying remedies, 
Congress can alter the definition of constitutional rights so long as it does 
not go too far.
V. THE CONSTITUTION AND COERCIVE INTERROGATION
A. Redescribing the Fifth Amendment Privilege
As the preceding discussion should suggest, there is no obviously 
precise or proper interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination.  
At best, we can struggle to define a core and shifting periphery of doctrine.
Clearly within the core is a narrow trial right: the ban on forcing a person to 
testify against herself at her criminal trial.  A slightly broader reading of the 
text would include testimony by any person at a criminal trial, before a 
grand jury, or at a preliminary hearing.188  The rest of this section starts 
from a remedial perspective to confirm and expand this broader view of the 
186 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 28, at 1778-87 (noting the Constitution does not 
require a remedy for every violation of a right, so long as remedies are available in most 
cases).  I quarrel with this point only to the extent that I doubt the value in many 
circumstances of calling something a right in the absence of a remedy.  Worth noting here 
is that although I object to the term “prophylactic,” it could survive as a way to mark out 
the areas of constitutional doctrine over which Congress (and perhaps the states) shares 
interpretive authority.  For a discussion of core vs. prophylactic rights that emphasizes the 
possibilities this distinction creates for experimentation, see Dorf, supra note 157, at 70-73.
187 See Monaghan, supra note 141 (suggesting the Court sometimes gives us more than the 
Constitution, in the form of constitutional common law); Sager, supra note 141(suggesting 
the Court sometimes gives us less than the Constitution, in the form of underenforced 
norms).
188 See Friendly, supra note 85, at 676.
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core.  To some extent, this section makes a descriptive claim – that text  and
history, with the assistance of the remedial perspective, tell us what the 
current scope of the privilege really is.  But my goals are critical and 
prescriptive as well.  I seek to justify a fairly expansive core doctrine even 
as I admit the limits of my arguments, and I ultimately concede an area of 
shared interpretation between Court and Congress.189
1. Learning from Immunity
The Supreme Court has developed two remedies for people from 
whom incriminating statements have been compelled in a custodial or 
formal setting but outside a criminal trial.  The first is narrow and close to 
the text: the compelled statement is excluded from evidence at a subsequent 
criminal trial.  The second is broader: the person from whom the statement 
was taken receives immunity from the use or derivative use of that 
statement in a subsequent criminal investigation or prosecution.190 Initially, 
therefore, the privilege against self-incrimination is more than a right not to 
be called to testify at trial; it also takes account of conduct outside the 
trial.191  Although the exclusionary remedy clearly suggests a trial right, the 
broad remedy of use and derivative-use immunity su ggests something more.
To some extent, immunity can be described as ultimately about the 
trial as well.  Under Kastigar, a grant of immunity allows the government to 
compel testimony and use it against other people (most obviously at trial) 
and protects the person who gave the testimony from having compelled 
information used against her (again, most obviously at trial).192  Yet this 
189 Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 28, at 1737-38 (suggesting constitutional doctrine 
should be normatively attractive and descriptively accurate).  I take incorporation of the 
privilege for granted throughout my discussion.  Compare Dripps, Against, supra note 85 
(suggesting the Supreme Court should “disincorporate” the privilege).
190 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2002 (plurality opinion).
191 Here I should note a third remedy or protection associated with the privilege: the 
protection against comment by the prosecution on one’s express or implied assertion of the 
privilege.  See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).  This particular remedy or 
protection supports a trial right interpretation of the privilege, but it is also a key precedent 
for a broader constitutional right to remain silent.  In other words, it can also be described 
as a trial remedy that protects a broader right.
192 See Clymer, supra note 63, at 465-66 (making this point).  The same objection and 
response can be made about the cases involving restrictions on use by state actors of 
economic threats to compel incriminating statements.  See id. at 467-72 (making the 
objection).  Similarly, Mark Godsey relies on Kastigar to support the trial right theory of 
self-incrimination.  He claims the Court “made clear that the ‘sole concern’ of the privilege 
was not the forcible extraction of statements; rather the privilege only prohibits such 
statements from being introduced at trial or similar proceeding to inflict criminal penalties 
upon the person who was ‘compelled’ to speak.”  Godsey, supra note 55, at 877 (quoting 
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453).  Yet Godsey quotes the Court out of context.  In the course of 
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description wrongly ignores the fact that the immunity remedy also 
provides a real, enforceable protection against compelled incrimination 
outside the courtroom.  Absent a grant of immunity, again as per Kastigar, 
the Constitution forbids compelling a person to incriminate herself in a 
variety of formal and custodial settings.193  In short, following Michigan v. 
Tucker and Minnesota v. Murphy, the privilege is, first, a trial right not to 
have compelled statements used against one and, second, a broader right not 
to have statements compelled by state actors where those statements might 
be used against the speaker in a criminal trial.  The immunity remedy means 
that, contrary to the claims of some commentators, compulsion of testimony 
outside the courtroom – without more – violates the privilege.
While I think this analysis supports a fairly broad scope for the 
privilege, one could still reasonably insist that the real focus of the right 
remains the criminal trial, and that the remedies developed by the Court are 
simply powerful methods of protecting the witness from testifying against 
herself in any meaningful way, whether directly or indirectly.194  To the 
extent that objection has force, the immunity remedy is broader than the 
underlying right, and we ought to be concerned about its legitimacy as 
inviolable constitutional law.  Justice Thomas resolved this concern by 
simply classifying immunity as a prophylactic rule presumably subject to 
congressional override.  Based on the assumption that the privilege is only a 
trial right, he has the better of the argument – Congress can modify or reject 
the immunity remedy.  And once we accept this analysis for immunity, its 
application to Miranda follows a fortiori.  Yet we need not go so far with
explaining that the Constitution requires only use and derivative-use immunity, the Court 
said:
The privilege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes it 
cannot subsequently be prosecuted.  Its sole concern is to afford protection 
against being “forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of 
‘penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.’”  Immunity from the use of 
compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly 
therefrom, affords this protection.
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (citations omitted).  Nothing in this statement declares the 
privilege to be only a trial right.  To the contrary, the entire thrust of the Court’s analysis –
that immunity must be coextensive with the privilege, both of which apply outside the trial
(as used by the Court, the word “testimony” clearly means more than trial testimony) –
undermines Godsey’s claim.
193 Obviously, if the view of the dissenters in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), had 
prevailed, immunity would rarely if ever be an option, and the privilege would be far 
stronger and plainly more than a trial right.  But the rejection of their position and the 
resulting allowance of immunity does not mean that the privilege is only a trial right.  It is 
weaker outside the courtroom than it could have been, but it still has force.
194 See, e.g., Clymer, supra note 63, at 459-78.
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Justice Thomas.  The best course is to recognize what the remedies tell us: 
the core right itself goes beyond the trial.  While Congress has a role in 
defining the right by modifying the remedies available for violations of the 
privilege, it would go too far were it to adopt remedies that define the 
privilege as only a trial right.
2. Justifying a Broad Privilege
The remedial perspective helps describe the actual scope of the right 
protected by the privilege but does not by itself justify that scope.  Attacks 
on the privilege, most notably by David Dolinko and Judge Henry Friendly, 
undermine many of the policy arguments that the Court employed in 
Murphy.195 Yet several arguments remain available to buttress a broad 
195 See Dolinko, supra note 89; Friendly, supra note 85.  While Dolinko’s analysis is 
impressive and convincing, he overplays his hand in a few instances.  First, and most 
important, the privilege can protect innocent defendants.  Compare infra notes 219-29 and 
accompanying text, with Dolinko, supra note 89, at 1074-77, and Dripps, Against, supra
note 85, at 715-16 (expanding on Dolinko’s point to argue the privilege will never protect 
innocent defendants but might cause their conviction by denying them exculpatory 
evidence).  Second, Dolinko suggests the privilege cannot be justified on the ground that it 
makes the trial more of an equal contest, because if we really wanted to achieve this goal, 
we would “enabl[e] the defendant to develop and present any facts or legal arguments that 
could establish his innocence.”  Dolinko, supra note 89, at 1076-77.  Surely this is an 
example of the best being the enemy of the good.  True, we could increase the funds 
available for indigent criminal defense, which would allow greater development of 
evidence and arguments and better serve the equalization goal than merely allowing the 
privilege.  But if legislatures do not approve the large expense necessary to equalize 
criminal trials by giving more tools to the defense, then denying tools to the prosecution 
may be the only reasonable way to achieve this goal.  Dolinko then dismisses the claim that 
incriminating statements should be excluded because they are unreliable, on the ground 
that “other unreliable sorts of evidence are routinely admitted at trial.  Id. at 1077 n.76.  Yet 
by the logic of his equalization argument, he ought to have argued for excluding all 
unreliable evidence.  Third, Dolinko claims the privilege undermines popular esteem for 
the criminal justice system.  Id. at 1088-89.  To some extent, Justice Kennedy addressed 
this issue in Chavez.  See 123 S. Ct. at 2015 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  More generally, Dolinko conveniently ignores the social meaning of Miranda.  
The Court’s decision in Dickerson suggests an appreciation for the fact that the privilege is 
seen – rightly or wrongly – as a cornerstone of the criminal justice system, particularly at 
the investigative stage.  See also Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2664.  Finally, Dolinko 
contends privacy arguments for the privilege fail, in part because by their logic the 
privilege should apply any time an incriminating statement would result in adverse 
consequences from the state, criminal or otherwise.  Dolinko, supra note 89, at 1114-15.  
This claim seems ahistorical.  At the time the privilege developed, there was no well-
developed regulatory state with a general practice of imposing civil penalties for non-
compliance with law.  In that context, the privacy rationale for a privilege only in criminal 
proceedings is more forceful.  In the present context, Dolinko’s objection suggests the 
privacy rationale eroded as times changed, but one could just as easily use his objection as 
support for extending the privilege to non-criminal proceedings, at least when penalties are 
Constitutional Interpretation and Coercive Interrogation 49
privilege at trial and beyond.  
The first argument draws from the text.  Whatever our individual 
views of the privilege, the text of the Constitution clearly creates at least a 
criminal trial right.  As I already have noted, moreover, the most convincing 
textual interpretations support the cases that have applied the privilege to 
other proceedings in addition to the trial.  The logic of the text, in other 
words, supports a broader privilege, and we should accept that logic as a 
matter of constitutional principle.  Even the approach to constitutional 
interpretation that I outlined earlier in this article would not allow us to 
“pick and choose which of its provisions we are willing to obey” or to 
“constru[e] the privilege to death because we think its basic policy is 
mistaken.”196 In short, we must accept the criminal trial right, and once we 
do so, we must also read the text fairly to include other proceedings, too197
The second argument is historical.  As best we can recapture the 
original understanding, the privilege was intended to prohibit “(1) 
incriminating interrogation under oath, (2) torture, and (3) probably other 
forms of coercive interrogation such as threats of future punishment and 
promises of leniency.”198  That is, as Albert Alschuler concludes, the 
privilege centered less on a right to remain silent at trial and more on 
“improper methods of gaining information from criminal suspects.”199  In 
addition, Eben Moglen has argued that constitutionalization of the privilege 
emerged from revolutionary concerns about maintaining liberty and 
autonomy against despotic governments.  The privilege was part of a 
package of rights linked to the “function of the jury trial in limiting 
governmental power.”200  During ratification, anti-federalists transferred 
severe enough.  Cf. Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2647 n.83 (noting the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is narrower that the nemo tenetur maxim in one respect: “the older maxim could 
be invoked successfully when there was no risk of criminal punishment but merely a risk of 
civil liability or of injury to reputation”).
196 See Dripps, Against, supra note 85, at 723-24.
197 See id. at 724; Friendly, supra note 85, at 676.
198 Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2651.
199 Id. at 2652.
200 See Moglen, supra note 86, at 1087; see also id. at 1114-18.  Although her focus is more 
general and does not explicitly touch on criminal procedure, Joyce Appleby compliments 
Moglen’s argument in her discussion of how liberal ideas became an important part of 
revolutionary ideology.  She contends that beginning in the 1740s and 50s, colonial society 
became more atomized and less interdependent.
For a large number of men coming of age in the 1740s and 1750s the 
contrasting statuses of free and unfree, dependent and independent, came 
to represent stark alternatives. . . . This new social situation made 
contemporaries peculiarly sensitive to threats against their personal 
freedom.  Among the many satisfying human goals, liberty came to 
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this concern about tyranny to the federal government, and they insisted on a 
bill of rights that would include protection against “the potentially 
oppressive use of the criminal justice system by the new federal 
government.”201
The concern about tyranny seems excessive, not only from our 
perspective but also from that of others in the founding generation.  
Moreover, by itself, this concern does not require a broad privilege against 
self-incrimination because the due process clauses and the First Amendment 
could handle much of this work if there were no privilege.202 From an 
originalist perspective, of course, that argument fails – the privilege was 
understood to restrict improper methods of obtaining information from 
suspects, and so it should be interpreted (but perhaps with some concerns 
overshadow all others.  This changing balance between the demands of 
the community and the individual helps explain two puzzling American 
developments in the revolutionary era: why the colonists reacted with 
such frenzied apprehensiveness to Parliamentary efforts to enforce 
imperial controls, and why liberalism with its core affirmation of the 
individual’s claim upon society to protect his natural rights could so 
easily have displaced the devotion to order which animated colonial life a 
half-century earlier.
JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 144 
(1992).
201 Moglen, supra note 86, at 1122.  As Moglen explains more fully, four states proposed 
complete bills of rights that included language to constitutionalize the privilege, and he 
finds some evidence in the ratification debates to link these proposals with concerns about 
liberty and despotism.  See also SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERAL-
ISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 31 (1999) (highlighting 
the anti-federalist desire for a bill of rights to preserve “essential personal liberties retained 
by the people [including] trial by jury”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 536-43 (1969) (discussing the antifederalist desire for a bill 
of rights to preserve liberty).  Moglen and Alschuler disagree slightly on how the privilege 
operated in the early republic.  Moglen focuses on the role of section 8 of George Mason’s 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, which said an accused cannot “be compelled to give 
evidence against himself,” as a forerunner of the privilege.  Moglen, supra note 86, at 1118 
(quoting the Declaration).  He construes this language to include a right to silence that 
functioned as a symbolic statement about the limits of state power but was not observed in 
ordinary criminal trials.  Id. at 1126-27.  Alschuler  focuses on the idea of the privilege as a 
constraint on government conduct, not a right to be silent at trial, and he contends the 
broader right to remain silent emerged in the nineteenth century.  See Alschuler, supra note 
86, at 2656-57.  Both agree, in other words, that a right to remain silent in criminal trials 
became generally accepted only after adoption of the privilege.
202 See Dolinko, supra note 89, at 1079-80, 1085-87; Dripps, Against, supra note 85, at 
713, 716-17, 731.
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about incorporation).203  In any event, history has more to say about the 
privilege.
If a right to remain silent was not established as part of the privilege 
or was uncertain at the founding, it certainly emerged in state and federal 
law during the nineteenth century, most strongly out of the decision to allow 
defendants to give sworn testimony.  To protect defendants and satisfy 
constitutional concerns, the ability to testify under oath usually was linked 
to a prohibition against commenting on the silence of a defendant who 
chose not to testify.204 Much later, in Griffin v. California,205 the Supreme 
Court ratified these concerns by holding that the Constitution forbids 
comment on the defendant’s refusal to testify, thus cementing at least a 
limited right to silence one year before Miranda.
In the late nineteenth century, moreover, the Supreme Court –
influenced by libertarian ideas associated with the Republican party and 
classical legal thought – strengthened and expanded the constitutional 
privilege in a series of cases that interpreted it as more than a trial right.206
203 Cf. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-56 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(suggesting the original understanding of the privilege could require protection for 
incriminating documents similar to what the Court recognized in Boyd but later backed 
away from).  Compare Justice Scalia’s argument in Burnham v. Superior Court, that what 
counts is what the founding (or amending) generation understood, even if that 
understanding was incorrect as a factual matter.  See 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990) (plurality 
opinion).  By extension, even if the founding generation chose cumbersome methods or 
reacted to over-inflated concerns, what counts is what they thought and did.
204 See Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2660-63.  For a history of the constraints on testimony 
by criminal defendants and the move to allowing defendants to testify under oath in 
England and the United States, see George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as a Lie Detector, 107 
YALE L.J. 575 (1997).
205 380 U.S. 609 (1965); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 (1964) (referring 
to a suspect’s “absolute right to remain silent” during interrogation).
206 See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 
(1892); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  For discussion of the late nineteenth 
century Court’s insistence on the primacy of liberty, see OWEN M. FISS, VIII HISTORY OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN 
STATE, 1888-1910, at 19-20, 45-46, 389-90 (1993) (highlighting the Fuller Court’s 
emphasis on liberty); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF THE LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1993) (noting the links 
between liberty of contract and anti-slavery and Republican ideals); Duncan Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1728-31, 1737-
40 (1976) (noting classical legal thought’s emphasis on individuality and free will); see 
also Stephen A. Siegel, Let Us Now Praise Infamous Men, 73 TEX. L. REV. 661, 667-69, 
686-87 (1995) (summarizing the scholarly consensus on the Fuller Court’s concern for 
liberty); Stephen A. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 631, 634-35 
(2002) (same).
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Although these decisions may have been “excessive” in their portrayal of 
the government “in the role of a despotic power,”207 and the Court stepped 
back from their implications in Twining v. New Jersey,208 they plainly 
resonated with revolutionary and anti-federalist traditions that sha ped the 
original understanding of the privilege and still exist in American culture.209
One way of thinking about the late nineteenth century privilege 
cases is to see them as exercises in translating the privilege from the context 
of the founding era to the different circumstances of an emerging regulatory 
state.210 That process continues today, mindful of tradition but also 
cognizant of the pressures created by change.211 If the privilege reflects a 
concern about state power over criminal suspects, then taking that concern 
seriously may require a logical application of the privilege to a variety of 
proceedings and circumstances, even if we reject some of the rhetoric in the 
earlier cases.212  So, for example, if the Fuller Court’s concern about liberty 
drove expansion of the privilege in the late nineteenth century, concerns 
about police discretion and institutionalized racism may explain the Warren 
Court cases.213  Today, as the ongoing war on crime expands into the war 
on terror, concerns about liberty and police discretion – and a renewed 
concern about physical coercion – support a continued broad privilege.214
This perspective, in brief, uses history and persisting ideological 
207 CHARLES FAIRMAN, VII HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 741 (1987) (criticizing Boyd).
208 211 U.S. 78 (1908).  But of course, Twining also comfortably asserted that jury trials are 
not fundamental.  See id. at 110-11.  In other words, Twining set its face against, not just 
the privilege, but against an entire “cluster” of rights that revolutionary theorists saw as 
essential to restraining despotic power.  See Moglen, supra note 86, at 1087.
209 Akhil Amar thus gets it half right when he classifies Boyd as a Lochner-era case.  He 
treats Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as a stand-in for an overweening and now-
disregarded emphasis on property rights, with the result that Boyd, too, is an aberration.  
See AMAR, supra note 122, at 22-25.  Amar is correct that Boyd and Lochner are kin, but 
he misses their shared emphasis on a more general conception of liberty against a 
potentially despotic government that goes beyond rights to property, and he ignores the 
clear connection between these cases and aspects of the revolutionary tradition.
210 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
211 One could even use the problem of translation to help explain constitutional imprecision 
and even to justify giving Congress a role in the creation of constitutional meaning.
212 Thus, the analogy between founding-era pretrial examination by a magistrate and 
contemporary stationhouse interrogation has a firmer basis when seen as an issue of 
translation.  See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
213 See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 
GEO. L.J. 1153, 1155-59 (1998).
214 For contemporary proposals to control police discretion and safeguard liberty interests, 
see Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000); Parry, Judicial 
Restraints, supra note 6, at 122-38.
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commitments about constitutional liberty to rehabilitate to some extent the 
privacy and autonomy rationales frequently derided by critics of the 
privilege.
Bear in mind, however, that the process of translation is more 
complicated, because it could result in narrowing the scope of the right 
(unless translation operates as only a one-way ratchet, which seems 
untenable).  Even as I argue for a broad privilege, others could respond that 
circumstances have made the privilege unnecessary in formal proceedings 
and that the war on terror makes the liberty and discretion arguments swing 
against the privilege, or they could make the less dramatic argument that the 
development of due process doctrine has created a better way to address 
these concerns.215 Also, of course, one could object that my translation 
argument takes place at too high a level of generality (although it does draw 
on specific discussions of the privilege).216 To my mind, the text provides 
an adequate backstop against claims such as these, but the argument is 
hardly ironclad.
Whatever their limits, the textual and historical arguments work 
together to create a strong inference that the privilege must apply in the 
stationhouse as well as the courtroom.  Yale Kamisar’s famous comparison 
between the “mansions and gatehouses” of criminal procedure – that is, 
between the protective environment of the public criminal trial and the 
concealed rooms of police interrogation – captures the argument.217 And no 
one has distilled this point more forcefully than Stephen Saltz burg:
If the drafters of the fifth amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination intended that, as long as the possibility of 
incrimination in a criminal case exists, no magistrate, judge 
or court of the United States could compel a person to answer 
questions – even though the person is given a lawyer, the 
proceedings are public and recorded and scrupulously fair –
could they possibly have intended to permit other officials 
(police and prosecutors) to compel the same answers in secret 
sessions, most often unrecorded, without the suspect having 
counsel, and with no judicial protection against the nature 
215 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the original 
purposes of the privilege no longer support it).  
216 In the end, this exercise lends support to Michael Klarman’s claim that translation is 
indeterminate and tends simply to confirm the views of the person employing it.  See
Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 394-412 (1997).
217 YALE KAMISAR, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal 
Procedure, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 27-
40 (1980).
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and manner of questioning?  Such an honest question 
deserves an honest answer; the answer is Miranda.218
One might even argue that, once we follow the logic of the privilege to 
include other proceedings, the burden of persuasion should rest on those 
who oppose applying it to police interrogation.
Stephen Schulhofer has provided a third argument for the privilege
that I find more compelling than the first two because it homes in on the 
issue of reliability.  Schulhofer contends that “the privilege helps many 
innocent defendants and that acquitting these innocents is more important 
than convicting an equal or somewhat larger number of guilty 
defendants.”219 Rather than rely on theoretical or historical claims, 
Schulhofer grounds his argument in a fundamental decision facing any 
attorney who represents an innocent defendant:
Can you think of any reason why might not put your client on 
the stand if you have the choice?  Of course you can.  Every 
lawyer can.  Your client might have a highly prejudicial prior 
record that will become admissible once he takes the stand.  
There are likely to be suspicious transactions or associations 
that your innocent client will have to explain.  But he may 
look sleazy.  He may be inarticulate, nervous, or easily 
intimidated.  His vague memory on some of the details may 
leave him vulnerable to clever cross-examination.  Most 
ordinary citizens find that being a witness in any formal 
proceeding is stressful and confusing.  The problems are 
bound to be heightened when the witness happens to be on 
trial for his life or his liberty.  Some people can handle this 
kind of situation, but others, especially if they are poor, 
poorly educated or inarticulate, cannot.  They may handle the 
experience poorly whether or not they are guilty.220
218 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial 
Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 14 (1986); see also Dripps, Against, supra note 85, at 724-25 & 
n.97 (agreeing with Saltzburg).  In light of more recent historical research, one could 
quibble with Saltzburg’s assertion of exactly what the founding generation understood the 
privilege to mean, but his basic point remains sound. 
219 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 329 (1991) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Kind Words].  Schulhofer 
provides statistics that support an inference in his favor:  23% of felony defendants and 
34% of misdemeanor defendants who invoked the privilege in Philadelphia in the early 
1980s were acquitted.  See id. at 329-30.  These numbers do not mean that the acquitted 
defendants were innocent, but one hopes that the fact of acquittal – especially when the 
defendant did not take the stand and deny the charges – means that many of them were.
220 Id. at 330.
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In other words, Schulhofer’s argument fills out the Court’s brief reasoning 
in Griffin v. California supporting the holding that the Fifth Amendment 
bars comment on a defendant’s silence.221  This reasoning, in turn, 
buttresses the claim in Murphy that the privilege, “while sometimes ‘a 
shelter to the guilty,’ is often a protection to the innocent.”222 So, too, 
Schulhofer‘s words resonate with the Court’s more amorphous concern in 
Brown about “press[ing],” “browbeat[ing],” and “entrap[ping]” 
defendants.223
Nor can this logic be confined to trial testimony.  The same concerns 
support the Court’s application of the privilege to other formal proceedings
at which defendants or other witnesses must choose whether to testify.224 In 
other words, application of the privilege in these contexts has an affirmative 
policy justification that goes beyond text and history and is independent of 
the more familiar rationale of protecting the trial right.225
Finally, Schulhofer’s rationale also applies to police interrogation.  
Even critics of the privilege usually admit – as the Court held in Miranda –
that compulsion is inherent in stationhouse interrogation, although they 
often prefer unrealistic alternatives to the privilege, such as judicially 
supervised questioning of suspects.226  Not only is compulsion inherent to 
interrogation, but well-trained police interrogators are able to manipulate a 
suspect through a variety of techniques, including threats and deception.227
And these techniques are not practiced only on the guilty.  In addition to 
those who are acquitted at trial, many of those arrested, held, and 
interrogated are never charged with a crime.  In other words, large numbers 
of suspects who endure the inherent and often actual compulsion of 
221 380 U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965).
222 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
223 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896).
224 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) (listing proceedings at which the 
privilege is available to witnesses).
225 See id. at 440-41 (contending the broad scope of the privilege is necessary to protect the 
trial right); Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1341.
226 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966); Alschuler, supra note 86; AMAR, 
supra note 122, at 65-68; Dripps, Against, supra note 85; Friendly, supra note 85, at 712.  
Others urge reliance on the due process clauses to constrain abusive police interrogation.  
See Clymer, supra note 63, at 472-78; Dolinko, supra note 89, at 1079-80; Joseph D. 
Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 896-909 
(1979).  See also KAMISAR, supra note 217, at 37 (discussing claims that compulsion as a 
constitutional concept does not apply to police interrogation).  Compare Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 448-50 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (appearing to argue 
much interrogation is not coercive).
227 See Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1233-46 (2001). 
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interrogation are innocent.228  That fact gives real weight to concerns about 
individual dignity and autonomy.  More important, that fact should make it 
no surprise that “in a small but significant number of cases, widely 
employed interrogation practices create a significant risk of false 
confessions that, in turn, leads to an unacceptable risk of wrongful 
convictions resulting from such confessions.”229  In short, the text does not 
forbid extending the privilege to police interrogation, history supports it, 
and the reliability concern about convicting innocent defendants applies 
here with as much force as in the courtroom.  In addition, a liberty or 
dignity concern about subjecting innocent suspects to the compulsion 
inherent in interrogation even if they never give a false confession provides 
further support for applying the privilege to custodial situations.
What, then, of Miranda’s controversial holding that the Fifth 
Amendment not only applies to police interrogation but also requires police 
to warn suspects of their rights?230  The Miranda remedy excludes 
statements even when a defendant cannot present individualized proof of 
compulsion and made no effort to invoke the privilege during the 
interrogation.  Failure to give the Miranda warnings itself generates the 
remedy unless one of the exceptions to Miranda applies.  A fair assessment 
of this remedy could support a broad right to remain silent.231
Alternatively, Miranda might simply stand for the right to be advised of and 
allowed to assert one’s rights in a custodial setting.232  Critically, under 
almost any construction, the remedy that Miranda provides compels the 
conclusion that the decision broadens the scope of the Fifth Amendment, 
although subsequent cases limited the remedy and thereby reined in the 
right.233  Indeed, it is precisely because Miranda sought to expand the scope 
228 See KAMISAR, supra note 217, at 36 (citing statistics from the 1950s and 60s); Klein, 
Deconstitutionalized, supra note 55, at 462 (citing statistics from the 1980s).  If as many as 
50% of those arrested are never convicted of a crime, see id., then inherently coercive 
interrogation is practiced on large numbers of the innocent as well as on the guilty.
229 WHITE, supra note 38, at 139; see also White, supra note 227, at 1224-29.
230 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461, 467-74 (1966).
231 See Michael Avery, You Have a Right to Remain Silent, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 571, 
583-87 (2003).
232 See Dorf & Friedman, supra note 139, at 63-64, 78; compare George C. Thomas III, 
Separated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2001) (arguing Miranda should be seen today as basically a notice 
case), with Susan R. Klein, Miranda’s Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIM. 567 (2001) (arguing Miranda should continue to be understood as a 
prophylactic self-incrimination case).
233 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1985) (allowing admission of 
defendant’s statement given after warnings even though defendant had already been 
interrogated in violation of Miranda); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) 
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of the Fifth Amendment that the Court called it prophylactic in the later 
cases as a way of retreating from the full implications of the decision.
The point I want to make, of course, is not only that a broad 
definition of the right in Miranda compels a broad remedy but also that the 
broad remedy provided by Miranda compels a broader definition of the 
right, while a narrower definition of the right necessarily creates more room 
for congressional modification of the remedy.  So, if the focus of the 
privilege is actual, compelled incrimination under circumstances that go 
beyond some assumed baseline of normal interrogation, then the Miranda
remedy, premised on a presumption of inherent compulsion in custodial 
settings, seems quite broad, and Congress should have room to tinker with it 
– perhaps even to the extent of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which the Court struck 
down in Dickerson.  If, on the other hand, the right encompasses more than 
protection against actual compulsion, then the Miranda remedy is a tighter 
fit and Congress has less room to maneuver.
Miranda’s additional holding that suspects can waive their right to 
remain silent234 – even though waiver takes place in the same problematic 
atmosphere of interrogation – is central to inter preting the right that the 
Court created.  The availability of waiver – effectively a limit on the remedy 
created by the warnings – allows a reading of Miranda that deemphasizes 
the rights to remain silent and to be free in general of the compulsion
inherent in interrogation.  With waiver, the Court concluded police 
interrogation is constitutionally permissible despite the fact that compulsion 
is inherent in it, and it may even have believed that some compulsion is
desirable.235 Miranda thus implements, perhaps imperfectly, a broad 
conception of fairness in criminal investigation – a better atmosphere for 
suspects but without hamstringing legitimate police attempts to solve 
crimes.  To that end, the Court expanded the privilege against self-
incrimination to include a substantive right to be free of some but not all of 
(allowing a public safety exception to Miranda); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 
(1974) (allowing use of the fruits of an interrogation that violates Miranda); Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing use for impeachment of statements taken in violation 
of Miranda); Levinson, supra note 143, at 909-10.
234 See 384 U.S. at 475. 
235 Thus, the Court implicitly rejected the alternative of examination by or in the presence 
of a magistrate.  The Court also stepped back from holding that police interrogation must 
take place in the presence of counsel, which could have followed from Escobedo v. Illinois, 
378 U.S. 478 (1964).  See Klein, Deconstitutionalized, supra note 55, at 423 (“at the time 
Escobedo v. Illinois was decided, many commentators feared that its sweeping language 
regarding the need for counsel before confessions are taken and its attack on the use of 
confessions in general presaged the development of a new rule that would bar both 
uncounseled confessions and volunteered statements”).
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the compulsion inherent in interrogation.236 Put another way, the Miranda
warnings can be seen as intended to dispel enough compulsion to allow a 
suspect to reflect on whether to talk or remain silent.237
But because the remedy provided by Miranda turns on a 
presumption of compulsion, it will apply regardless of the actual amount of 
compulsion felt by each individual. In some cases – perhaps particularly 
those involving hardened or experienced criminals – the amount of 
compulsion arising out of the fact of interrogation alone will not be 
significant.  Suspects in these cases will be fully capable of reflecting on 
whether to talk or remain silent even if no warnings are given.  The certain 
existence of such cases could tempt Congress to craft a more precise 
remedy that accomplishes the goal of reducing compulsion.238
Section 3501, which essentially sought to overrule Miranda and 
reassert the totality of the circumstances test as the only standard for 
assessing custodial interrogation, was plainly inadequate.239  Yet if we 
accept that Congress has some power to define the right in the course of 
modifying the remedy, then it need not go as far as Miranda.240 Assume, 
for example, that Congress decides the remedy of exclusion should be 
available in federal court if the suspect was aware neither that her 
statements could be used against her nor that she could seek the assistance 
of counsel at any time (as well as when any statement is compelled or 
involuntary under the totality of the circumstances test).  Although 
confessions might be admitted under this rule where suspects mistakenly 
believe they have an obligation to respond to police questioning, this 
236 Compare Clymer, supra note 63, at 479-85 (arguing Miranda rests on a finding of 
inherent coercion in custodial interrogation but is still a case about admissibility of 
evidence and the need to safeguard the trial right).
237 See 384 U.S. at 467 (stating the goal of the warnings is “to combat” – not entirely dispel 
– “these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege”); id. at 469-70 
(acknowledging warnings cannot really dispel the coercion inherent in interrogation).  This 
substantive right, of course, encompasses an idea of notice, but it is also a right to a lesser 
degree of the coercion presumed to be part of police interrogation.  Compare Thomas, 
supra note 232 (arguing Miranda should be understood today to create a procedural due 
process right to notice).
238 See Caminker, supra note 130, at 14-18.
239 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 436; Caminker, supra note 130, at 20; Dorf & Friedman, 
supra note 139, at 72.
240 Miranda, of course, says that any alternative “safeguards” for the privilege must be 
“fully as effective” as those announced by the Court.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 490 (1966).  Thus, I disagree, not with the Court’s effort to define its holding as an 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, see id. (“In any event . . . the issues presented are of 
constitutional dimension”), but with its attempt to assert too rigid a distinction between 
right and remedy at the periphery of the privilege.
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remedy – and the corresponding definition of the right that it entails – takes 
account of the actual level of compulsion and focuses on the suspect’s 
ability to reflect on whether to talk or remain silent.  Whether or not this 
hypothetical statute provides a good remedy for the routine coercion of 
police interrogation, the outer limits of the right and remedy are questions 
of constitutional policy best left to Congress.  Although the question would 
be close, this statute should survive judicial review if it re flects a reasonable 
interpretation of Miranda and defines a right that is sufficiently close to 
what the Court sought to accomplish.241
3. The Critical Role of Damages
For all my efforts to justify a broad constitutional privilege outside 
the criminal courtroom and especially in the stationhouse, its status remains 
uncertain.  To see why, remember the central issue in Chavez:  Martinez 
asked the courts to hold that damages are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
as an additional remedy – and, sometimes, the only available remedy – for 
violations of the privilege.  Of course, damages will almost never be 
available for violations of the privilege during courtroom proceedings, 
because the judge, prosecutor, and police officers acting as witnesses would 
have absolute immunity in any resulting civil rights action.242  But the 
remedy of automatic use and derivative-use immunity that would flow from 
these violations is probably sufficient (especially since the remedy would 
likely also trigger a mistrial if the violation occurred at trial).  In any event 
241 For other hypothetical statutes, see Caminker, supra note 130, at 20-24; Dorf & 
Friedman, supra note 139 (analyzing an extensive series of hypotheticals).
242 See Brisco v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (police officers acting as witness); Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) 
(prosecutors).  Injunctive relief will almost never be available for violations of the privilege 
in or out of court.  Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against government officials must 
demonstrate standing to seek prospective relief, which in turn requires a realistic claim that 
they are reasonably likely to suffer future harm of the type they are complaining about.  See
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983).  In this context, a plaintiff 
would have to claim that she is likely to be questioned by police about criminal activity in 
the future (which comes close to an assertion that she is likely to be suspected of criminal 
activity in the future), that the interrogation is likely to be coercive, and – depending on 
one’s exact definition of the privilege – perhaps also that the authorities will somehow 
succeed in introducing the resulting statements at trial.  Cf. Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 
199 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (suggesting Lyons rests in part on the 
unlikelihood that plaintiff would engage in future misconduct requiring police 
intervention).  Of course, the inability to obtain injunctive relief also weakens the 
underlying right, but because Lyons applies to all rights claims, that problem – while 
significant and relevant – has no special salience here.  See Parry, Judicial Restraints, 
supra note 6, at 117-18 (discussing advantages of injunctive relief, including enhancement 
of the meaning and value of rights).
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the disallowance of damages here flows from a general concern about 
imposing liability on courtroom actors regardless of the constitutional right 
violated and has nothing to do with the privilege in particular.
The world outside the courtroom is different.  Subject to a variety of 
restraints, damages generally are available for violations of constitutional 
rights by non-courtroom state actors.243 If damages were available for 
violation of the privilege outside the courtroom, then the scope and strength 
of the privilege would be more firmly established – it would be like other 
rights. Purely from a remedial perspective, moreover, the privilege literally 
would be worth more to those whom it protects.  So, too, its deterrent power 
would increase significantly from that provided by immunity and exclusion 
alone.244
If the privilege applies as a matter of constitutional right outside the 
criminal trial, then limiting the remedies to immunity and exclusion of 
testimony creates an unstable right, precisely because the lack of a damages 
remedy suggests there may not really be a substantive right.  The immunity 
and exclusion remedies, after all, can be described as safeguards for a trial 
right.245  Coming from the other direction, if these remedies are merely 
safeguards for a trial right, then one can easily understand the argument 
against imposing damages on state actors in federal civil rights actions for 
violations of non-constitutional rules.  At best, we are left in a tenuous 
position.  But if the right is to be as strong as its definition in caselaw often 
indicates, then damages should be available.
Perhaps the Court already realizes this.  Justice Thomas’s opinion, 
in particular, suggests he understood that the scope of the remedies 
provided for violation of the privilege helps to define the scope of the right.  
Allowing damages for conduct outside the trial would be inconsistent with 
the view that the privilege only protects a trial right.  Moreover, he saw that 
even the immunity remedy is in tension with that view, and thus he went out 
of his way to declare immunity merely a prophylactic protection for the trial 
right.246  For his part, Justice Souter’s approach to the appropriate remedy 
matches his Harlan-derived vision of the privilege as a right that goes 
beyond trial but that does so only weakly.  He, too, understood that 
allowing damages as a routine matter would make the right more powerful 
than his sense of the appropriate policy balance would allow.  Thus, when 
243 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (defining the qualified immunity 
standard that largely determines when such claims may be heard on the merits).
244 See Levinson, supra note 143, at 904 (“a right with less remedy is worth less and a right 
with more remedy is worth more”) (emphasis original).
245 See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text (discussing this point).
246 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2003-04 (plurality  opinion).
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he declared his reluctance to “expand the protection of the privilege against 
self-incrimination to the point of civil liability,”247 he explicitly linked the 
scope of the privilege to the package of available remedies.  Finally, Justice 
Kennedy insisted that damages should be available (although not for 
Miranda violations) precisely because the right is a substantive protection 
that sweeps more broadly than the criminal trial.248
Without damages, the set of remedies for violations of the privilege 
is probably inadequate.  Consider particularly situations in which law 
enforcement officials conclude it is worth compelling a statement from one 
person in order to have evidence that will lead to more significant suspects.  
In that situation, immunity and exclusion will provide inadequate 
deterrence, with the result that the right will be violated more often than if 
damages were available.  And, as Steven Clymer has shown, in the context 
of Miranda the incentives to violate the privilege overwhelm the incentives 
to comply with it.249
That said, perhaps we should broaden the focus.  As Justice Harlan 
emphasized, decisions about the constitutional constraints on custodial 
interrogation – and the remedies for unconstitutional interrogations – are 
issues of constitutional, not just Fifth Amendment , policy.250  If we get 
adequate protection against compelled incrimination outside the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, then we have less at stake in whether the privilege is 
a trial right or, if it is, whether damages are available for its violation.  If, on 
the other hand, there is a gap in protection, we must decide how much of a 
gap, if any, we want to tolerate.  Put bluntly, both the trial right 
interpretation of the privilege and the interpretation I have advanced are 
logical.  If the Due Process Clauses do the same work as my interpretation 
of the privilege, then the choice between the two interpretations becomes 
less important.  But if the Due Process Clauses are not coextensive with my 
interpretation of the privilege, then accepting the trial right interpretation 
also requires accepting a gap in protection against compelled testimony.  
Chavez suggests that the Court will allow compelled testimony and 
coercive interrogation (to the extent there is a difference between the two) at 
the price, at most, of use and derivative-use immunity and exclusion of 
evidence, so long as the coercion is not too shocking.  In my view, the 
protection that Chavez would provide is far too little.  Either due process 
247 Id. at 2007 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
248 Id. at 2014 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249 See Clymer, supra note 63, at 502-25.
250 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 511 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing the 
Court has already addressed issues of compelled incrimination under the due process 
clause, so there is no need to expand the privilege against self-incrimination as well).
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will have to provide a great deal of protection in order to narrow the gap, or 
we must embrace a conception of the privilege as a right that goes beyond 
the trial and is enforceable by damages – or both.  The next section 
addresses the scope of the due process protection against coercive 
interrogation.  As we will see, without doctrinal change, the due process 
right and remedy are almost certainly inadequate.
B. Due Process and Coercive Interrogation
The Due Process Clauses intersect with interrogation in two ways.  
First, involuntary confessions are inadmissible as a matter of due process.  
Second, some interrogation practices are so severe that they violate 
substantive due process rights and will support a claim for damages even 
under the position adopted by the Chavez plurality.251  The Chavez plurality 
ducked the question of when conduct that produces a confession that is 
involuntary and thus inadmissible can also support a damages claim.  By 
contrast, the lower courts in Chavez and Justice Ginsburg, and to some 
extent Justices Stevens and Kennedy, seemed to take the position that there 
is substantial overlap between inadmissible involuntary confessions and 
substantive due process-violating interrogation practices.  
1. Involuntary Confessions
A confession is involuntary in violation of due process if “’a 
defendant’s will was overborne’ by the circumstances surrounding the 
giving of a confession.”252  To make this determination, a court must 
consider “’the totality of all the surrounding circumstances – both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’”253
Moreover, when describing the details of an interrogation, courts often 
describe the interrogators’ actions as “coercive.”254  But the Court has also 
insisted that “a finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by 
a government agent; a credible threat is sufficient.”255  Other cases make 
clear that “promises of leniency, threats of adverse consequences to others, 
251 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004-05 (conceding damages are available for interrogation 
practices that violate substantive due process rights); see also Clymer, supra note 63 
(arguing the privilege and Miranda are trial rights and due process standards control the 
availability of damages); Loewy, supra note 63 (same).
252 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (quoting Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
253 Id. (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226).
254 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991) (concluding defendant’s 
“will was overborne in such a way as to render his confession the product of coercion”); 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (holding some form of “official coercion” 
or “oppressive” or “overreaching” police conduct is a necessary part “of the inquiry into 
constitutional ‘voluntariness’”).
255 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287.
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and certain types of deception would qualify as improper police practices, 
which, at least in the context of a prolonged interrogation, might be 
sufficient to render a resulting confession involuntary.”256  The test, in other 
words, is whether the interrogation tactics made the confession involuntary, 
and coercion is a short- hand description of the kind of atmosphere in which 
a defendant would make an involuntary statement.257  While easily stated, 
the test is famously difficult to apply in a consistent manner.258
Importantly, moreover, the Supreme Court appears to equate the 
circumstances that make a confession involuntary with the level of pressure 
necessary to make testimony compelled in violation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination.259 One result of this equation is that few courts will find 
a confession involuntary under due process if the suspect received the 
Miranda warnings, waived them, and thus apparently spoke free of Fifth 
Amendment compulsion.260
Not everyone agrees with the equation of compulsion and 
involuntariness.  Stephen Schulhofer, for example, maintains that the two 
inquiries are obviously distinct.  Compulsion, for Schulhofer, is pressure,
but due process requires the additional step of breaking a suspect’s will
256 WHITE, supra note 38, at 46.
257 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287 n.3 (“Our prior cases have used the terms ‘coerced 
confession’ and ‘involuntary confession’ interchangeably ‘by way of convenient 
shorthand.’) (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960)).
258 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (stating a totality of the circumstances inquiry into 
voluntariness “is more difficult than Miranda for officers to conform to, and for courts to 
apply in a consistent manner”); WHITE, supra note 38, at 39-48; see also Catharine 
Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2201 (1996) (arguing that, 
despite its complexity, the due process inquiry has not relied solely on a totality of the 
circumstances inquiry and instead has “exhibit[ed] the creation of per se rules, a focus on 
ordinary people, and a concern with procedural safeguards that have come to be identified 
with Miranda”).
259 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (appearing to assume that terms such as “involuntary,” 
“totality of the circumstances,” and “compelled” describe the same inquiry); Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) (“unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence 
under Miranda”) (emphasis added); id. at 309 (“It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda 
to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual 
coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise 
his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed 
waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.”) (emphasis added); New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (equating Fifth Amendment compulsion with 
“coercion”); see also Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2626-27 n.6 (suggesting compulsion for 
purposes of the privilege and coercion for purposes of due process are functionally the 
same).
260 See WHITE, supra note 38, at 120-22.
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through coercion, thus making a confession not just compelled but also 
involuntary.261  In the context of this article, Schulhofer’s approach appears 
to contemplate three levels of constitutional concern about interrogation:  
concern under the privilege for non-coercive compulsion that would 
exclude more testimony than would current doctrine; concern under due 
process for additional pressure – coercion – that breaks the will and makes a 
confession involuntary; and concern under substantive due process for 
coercion that shocks the conscience and supports an award of damages.  I 
sympathize with Schulhofer’s position – and depending on how the Court 
would apply a damages remedy, some version of his approach could 
become a reality262 – but the rest of my discussion will assume that 
compulsion and involuntariness are the same under current doctrine.
Before Chavez, several lower courts allowed damages claims for 
violations of the voluntariness test.  By contrast, few courts had allowed 
damages claims for violations of Miranda.263 Because the Court was 
fractured in Chavez, the validity of the lower court cases remains up for 
grabs.  With no clear resolution of the issue by the Court, we can expect 
continued § 1983 litigation over violations of the voluntariness test.  Yet if 
compulsion and involuntariness are the same thing, then the best 
interpretation of Chavez is that damages are almost never available for 
involuntary confessions unless the conduct that made the confession 
involuntary is conscience-shocking.  Remember that the four justice 
plurality would have held that damages are never available for compelled 
testimony in violation of the privilege, and Justices Souter and Breyer 
declared that damages should rarely be available in such cases.  In short, the 
best we can say about the implications of Chavez is that it seems unlikely 
the Court will embrace anytime soon the position that every involuntary 
confession will support a da mages claim.  Far more clearly than the 
privilege, in other words, the due process voluntary confession doctrine is a 
trial right.  
2. Interrogation and Substantive Due Process
With the involuntary confession doctrine operating as a trial right, 
we immediately find a potential gap in protection against coercive 
interrogation.  The Chavez plurality’s approach to substantive due process
confirms the gap and demonstrates its breadth.  The plurality considered 
261 See Schulhofer, Reconsidering, supra note 87, at 440-46; Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 941, 944-48 (2001).
262 See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
263 See supra note 55.
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two approaches to substantive due process:  shocks the conscience, and 
fundamental rights.  The shocks the conscience test has an uneasy place in 
substantive due process doctrine.  Sacramento v. Lewis resurrected it from 
apparent dormancy, but with significant ambiguity.  Lewis seemed to 
suggest the test applies to executive conduct while the familiar fundamental 
rights-liberty interest dichotomy applies to legislative action.264  Yet, Lewis
also suggested that the fundamental rights analysis is a second step after a 
finding that conduct shocks the conscience.265  In Chavez, however, Justice 
Thomas treated the two inquiries as alternatives.266  No other justice clearly 
disputed this point.267
Even before Lewis, however, critics on and off the Court charged 
that the shocks the conscience test was simply too vague to be applied, and 
the charge was renewed after Lewis, buoyed, perhaps, by Justice Scalia’s 
Cole Porter-inspired riff against it.268 Chavez does little to help in this area.  
264 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).  Arguably, the shocks the 
conscience standard was actually rehabilitated in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 
U.S. 115 (1992), in which the Court declared that the City’s “alleged failure to train its 
employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm, was an omission that can not 
properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience-shocking, in a constitutional sense.”  
Id. at 128.  As Harry Tepker has observed, the Court apparently meant that the plaintiff had 
not shown the City’s failure to act was more than a typical state-law tort claim.  See Harry 
F. Tepker, Jr., The Arbitrary Path of Due Process, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 207-08 (2000).
265 Id. at 847 n.8.
266 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005 (plurality opinion).
267 Justice Souter’s discussion of substantive due process quoted Lewis’s shocks the 
conscience standard and so could be read as suggesting that the fundamental rights 
standard should not also be available.  See id. at 2008 (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849).  Justice Kennedy said little about the precise 
due process framework he employed, but he cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952) – the original shocks the conscience case – as support for his claim that “torture or 
its equivalent . . . violates an individual’s fundamental right to liberty.”  Id. at 2016 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
268 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“today’s opinion 
resuscitates the ne plus ultra, the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane 
of subjectivity, th’ ol’ ‘shocks-the-conscience’ test”).  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
responded by describing the test as grounded in “traditions, precedents, and historical 
understanding [as] the starting point, but not in all cases the ending point.”  Id. at 857 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  For other criticisms of Lewis and the shocks the conscience 
test, see Robert Chesny, Old Wine or New? The Shocks-the-Conscience Standard and the 
Distinction between Legislative and Executive Action, 50 SYR. L. REV. 981 (2000); Tepker, 
supra note 264; Matthew D. Umhofer, Confusing Pursuits: Sacramento v. Lewis and the 
Future of Substantive Due Process in the Executive Setting, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 437 
(2001); The Supreme Court, 1997 Term – Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 192 (1998).  
For a more sympathetic treatment of the test as simply a shorthand for asking whether 
action is constitutionally arbitrary, see Rubin, supra note 44, at 845-47.
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Justices Breyer, O’Connor, and Souter said nothing about the range of 
conduct that shocks the conscience.  Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and 
Ginsburg urged a fairly expansive view.  Justice Thomas, joined by Justices 
Scalia and Rehnquist, urged a restrictive view.
Critically, Justice Thomas’s opinion seems clearly in line with Lewis
on two issues.  First, the shocks the conscience test is a back stop, meant to 
forbid “only the most egregious official conduct.”269 The Chavez plurality 
and Lewis suggest that the egregious conduct requirement will usually 
require that the official acted with the “intent to injure.”270  In other words, 
the default culpability standard for shocks the conscience damages claims is 
specific intent – acting with the purpose of causing the injury – rather than
reckless disregard or even knowledge that injury is likely to occur. If so, 
then there almost certainly will be a large gap between the shocks the 
conscience test and a trial right conception of the privilege.  In the hands of 
the Chavez plurality, then, shocks the conscience is not just a shorthand for 
constitutionally arbitrary conduct – as some commentators had suggested –
because it plainly requires plaintiffs to show that official conduct is 
“egregious,” not just that it is unconstitutional and arbitrary enough to 
require exclusion of evidence.271
Second, Lewis mentioned and the Chavez plurality makes much of 
the idea that conduct only shocks the conscience if it is “unjustifiable by 
any government interest.”272  According to the plurality, the need to obtain 
“key evidence” justifies relentless interrogation of a seriously wounded 
man.  In fact, the possibility that Martinez may have been dying simply 
heightened the government’s need and, hence, the justification for the 
interrogation.273  Nor was this simply Justice Thomas’s idea.  The Solicitor 
General made the same argument in an amicus brief.274  Unless the Court 
places limits on the necessity idea, this argument justifies a range of 
otherwise shocking government conduct, potentially including torture.
The simple fact that the government can raise a necessity claim to 
justify coercive interrogation and perhaps even torture, while obviously 
troubling, is not a fatal objection.  Many – although not all – of the 
commentators who have considered the issue agree that torture is justifiable 
269 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
270 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005 (plurality opinion); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-54; see also
supra note 62 (noting the uncomfortable position in Chavez of Justice Souter, who wrote 
the lead opinion in Lewis). 
271 Compare Rubin, supra note 44, at 845-47.
272 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.
273 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005.
274 See Brief for United States, supra note 58, at 21-23.
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in extremely rare cases.275  Nonetheless, the Court’s use of the necessity 
rationale in an interro gation context is distressing.  The Court articulated a 
very relaxed standard – is there “any government interest”?  If the 
government can supply a need, then the conduct apparently will not shock 
the conscience.  In future cases, the Court should  toughen the standard 
significantly across the board or at least require greater justification for 
conduct that is more shocking than Chavez’s interrogation of Martinez.  In 
difficult cases, the need for information already exerts enormous pressure in 
favor of harsh methods, with the inevitable result that a vague or lenient 
standard is bound to fail.276
275 For an argument to that effect and a collection of other authorities, see Parry & White, 
supra note 54, at 760-65.  Put differently, despite the obvious and strong constitutional 
prohibition on torture, see id. at 751-53; Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the 
Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
278 (2003), the individual constitutional right to be free of torture is not absolute.  
(International law takes a different view.  See infra note 276.)  The most common pro-
torture hypothetical is the “ticking time bomb” scenario, in which law enforcement 
officials know a bomb will explode imminently in a crowded location, and they have in 
custody a person whom they are certain knows where the bomb is – yet that person will not 
talk.  See Parry & White, supra note 54, at 760-61.
276 For example, in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, the Supreme 
Court of Israel ruled that torture was illegal but the necessity defense would be available 
for officials prosecuted for the use of torture.  After discussing the ticking time bomb 
scenario, the court suggested that the imminence requirement of the necessity defense 
might be met even if the hypothetical bomb “is set to explode in a few days, or perhaps 
even after a few weeks.”  H.C. 5100/94, 53(4) P.D. 817 (1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 
1471, 1486 (1999).  In other words, the magnitude of the potential harm controlled and 
warped the imminence requirement.  See Parry & White, supra note 54, at 764 n.95.  The 
Chavez plurality’s necessity rationale is also troubling because of the conflict it creates 
with our obligations under international law.  The Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment flatly forbids torture as well as 
“other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount 
to torture.”  Pt. 1, art. 1, & 1, & art. 16, & 1 (1984), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/ a39r046.htm. The Convention does not define 
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” and in the course of giving its 
consent to the Convention, the U.S. Senate attempted to craft a more precise definition:  
“the United States considers itself bound by the obligation . . . to prevent ‘cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment,’ only insofar as the term . . . means the cruel, 
unusual and inhuman treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”  Resolution of Advice 
and Consent to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:  Reservations, Declarations, and 
Understandings I(1), 136 Cong. Rec. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).  In other words, the 
Senate declared that the Convention only bans conduct that is already unconstitutional and 
gave federal courts the ultimate power to define the United States’ understanding of its 
international obligations.  At the same time, however, the Convention also declares that no 
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Still, the shocks the conscience test is not the sum of substantive due 
process.  The Chavez plurality made clear that the more familiar 
fundamental rights test also applies to substantive due process claims 
challenging official conduct.  If the Court recognizes an interest as a 
fundamental right, the government may trample that right only if it can pass 
the strict scrutiny test: its action must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.277  In Bowers v. Hardwick278 and Washington v. 
Glucksberg,279 the Court set out a method for determining whether an 
interest rises to the level of a fundamental right.  The Court requires a 
“careful description” of the claimed right and asks whether that right is 
“deeply rooted” in history and tradition.280
The point of the careful description requirement was to prevent 
analysis at too high a level of generality that would open the door to judicial 
activism.281  Yet the plurality opinion in Chavez throws that requirement 
aside after paying lip service to it.  Rather than focusing on Martinez’s 
specific circumstances and tailoring the analysis to them, Justice Thomas 
insisted that Martinez sought a broad “freedom from unwanted police 
questioning,” and he easily rejected the argument.282  Freedom from 
unwanted questioning while severely wounded or near death would have 
been a more careful description of the claimed right, and Justice Thomas 
might then have had to determine whether the state had a compelling 
interest under the circumstances.283
justification is possible for acts of state torture. See Convention, supra, pt. 1, art. 2, ¶ 2.  
Thus, unless the Court changes course, the Chavez plurality’s statement that an action does 
not shock the conscience if there is “any government interest” creates a contradiction 
within our obligations under the Convention.
277 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 
301-02 (1993).
278 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 
2472 (2003).
279 521 U.S. 702.
280 Id. at 721; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91; see Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2006 (plurality 
opinion) (adopting this position).
281 See id.; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191, 194 -95; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-
28 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.).  For criticism of the idea that the Court should proceed from the 
most specific level of generality, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING 
THE CONSTITUTION (1991); Jack M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of 
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613 (1994).  
282 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2006 (plurality opinion).
283 As Mark Kelman noted in a different context, the use of a broad or narrow frame to 
guide analysis is a choice that varies from case to case depending on a party’s situation – so 
the inconsistent application of the “careful description” test should come as no surprise.  
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Chavez, together with Lawrence v. Texas284 and the earlier case of 
Troxel v. Granville,285 makes clear that the Bowers/ Glucksberg
methodology is malleable and that its application will be inconsistent and 
uncertain, depending in part upon how much room the Court is willing to 
make in individual cases for generalizations and historical change.286
Sometimes that malleability will aid those asserting a right, as in Lawrence
and Troxel, while at other times it will impede their efforts, as in Bowers
and Glucksberg.  Whether it ultimately will aid or impede Martinez in his 
suit against Chavez is a matter for remand, at least for now.287
Even if the fundamental rights approach is open to manipulation, it 
has one virtue.  Rather than simply articulate “any . . . interest,” the 
government must demonstrate a “compelling interest” and show that the 
means it has employed to achieve that interest are narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest.288  In the context of interrogation, for example, this standard 
suggests that the government could use torture in a ticking time bomb 
scenario, but only as something close to a last resort.289
See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 591 (1981).
284 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
285 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stating parents have a.fundamental right to make 
decisions about the care, custody, and control of their children).  The Court was as badly 
fractured in Troxel as it was in Chavez.
286 For example, in Lawrence, the Court criticized Bowers for “fail[ing] to appreciate the
extent of the liberty at stake,” which went beyond the right to engage in particular sexual 
conduct to encompass “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most 
private of places, the home.”  123 S. Ct. at 2478.  The Court also faulted Bowers for failing 
to recognize that “’history and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending 
point of the substantive due process inquiry.’”  Id. at 2480 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
287 Remember that, despite the plurality’s reasoning, a bare majority of the Court agreed 
that Martinez’s substantive due process claim remained available, although there was no 
clear majority rationale.  See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2008; supra note 59.  On remand, the 
Ninth Circuit held that Martinez had a clearly established right to be free of coercive police 
interrogation and sent the case back to the district court for further proceedings.  See
Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003), rhg. en banc denied, 354 
F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004).
288 Compare Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (stating action justified “by any government interest” 
does not shock the conscience), with Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) 
(stating strict scrutiny requires proof of a compelling interest), and Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (same).
289 Cf. Parry, What is Torture, supra note 1, at 260 (arguing the principle of escalation 
requires that torture be the last in a series of progressively more coercive practices).  The 
fundamental rights approach still raises problems under international law because it still 
allows justification of torture.  See supra note 276.  But the fundamental rights approach, at 
least, puts a real straightjacket on government action.
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But pressure may still arise to put a thumb in the government’s side 
of the scale.  Presumably, the test is not “strict in theory but fatal in fact” in 
the due process context any more than – after Grutter v. Bollinger290– it is 
in the equal protection context.291   If so, then we need to remember 
Korematsu, which teaches that that the test is easier to meet in times of war 
or crisis.292  After September 11, we have been told repeatedly that we are 
in a war on terrorism that requires real sacrifices of liberty to ensure 
security, and we have deployed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, in part to 
combat terror.  Disturbing reports suggest that some of our forces have 
come close to or even crossed the line of illegally coercive interrogation.293
Because of the context of fighting terrorism, moreover, these reports often 
seem to come with a built-in claim of justification.
Substantive due process constraints on coercive interrogation, in 
sum, do not provide as much protection as one might first expect.  In 
situations in which they perceive a need for information, officials will be 
tempted to cross the line between constitutional and unconstitutional 
conduct.  Although these actions might lead to exclusion of evidence and 
use immunity, Chavez – not to mention generally accepted substantive due 
process doctrine – suggests that damages will be hard to come by.
C. Managing the Gap
A gap clearly exists between the amount of protection a substantive 
rights conception of the privilege, enforceable by damages, could provide
(or that a due process voluntariness test backed up by damages could 
provide), and the protections actually provided by the privilege and due 
process under the Chavez plurality’s conception of current doctrine.  We 
must face, in other words, a series of choices about how strong the 
constitutional constraints on interrogation need to be.
One possible response is to affirm the status quo as it appears to 
exist after Chavez.  Evidence can be excluded and immunity granted for 
violations of the privilege or the due process voluntariness test, but damages 
are not available unless the unconstitutional conduct rises to a particularly 
egregious level.  Under this regime, the right to be free of coercive 
interrogation is mild in most cases and is a strong but not absolute 
constraint only as official conduct gets close to torture.  Justifications for 
this position might include skepticism about the amount of harm actually 
290 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
291 But note that Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest some practices are never permissible.  
See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2017 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
292 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
293 See Parry, What is Torture , supra note 1, at 237-38, 249-51.
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inflicted by conduct that falls short of the substantive due process 
standard.294  Some harms, after all, are inevitable when governments act, 
but – as the Court time and again insists – not all of them are of 
constitutional dimension.  
In the context of determining how criminal procedure and civil 
rights litigation overlap, we could add a level to this argument to say that 
even when harm rises to a constitutional level, it is not necessarily a 
constitutional tort. The remedy could be something other than damages, so 
that the strength of the constitutional right would be relatively weaker 
where harm is at the low end of the constitutional scale.  The Court in Lewis
seems to have adopted some version of this view, and the Chavez plurality 
simply relied on that understanding.295  Although this argument has force, 
we need to place it in the context of unconstitutionally coercive 
interrogation techniques that will be practiced against people – like 
Martinez – who are never charged with a crime, including suspects who are 
in fact innocent.  People in this situation do not have access to even the low-
level remedies of exclusion and immunity.  From the remedial perspective, 
they have few if any constitutional rights during custodial interrogation.  
For them, “it is damages or nothing.”296 Whether we should tolerate this 
conception of the right and the amount of harm it allows is ultimately a 
value judgment – one which I believe should be resolved in favor of 
allowing a damages cause of action.
One could also argue in favor of the post-Chavez status quo by 
emphasizing the need to free law enforcement officials from microscopic 
review of their actions because greater legal regulation – and particularly 
damages liability – would cause, and perhaps already causes, over-deter-
rence.  While common in the context of civil rights litigation, this argument 
is inadequate at such a broad level.  If damages were available for violations 
of the privilege or the due process voluntariness test, we would see more 
litigation, which would increase costs to officers and local governments.  
But that is exactly the point of allowing damages.  We live now in a 
294 In this sense, the Court’s treatment of interrogation claims could be compared to the 
traditional reluctance of common law judges to recognize emotional distress claims.  See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 & cmts. (1965); Martha Chamallas, The 
Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 491-503 
(1998).
295 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1998) (highlighting the 
concern expressed in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976), about turning the 
Constitution into a “font of tort law).
296 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring).
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situation of under-deterrence, and any effort to move toward the optimum 
level of deterrence requires increased incentives, which damages will 
provide.  Moreover, the general claim that constitutional tort litigation leads 
too quickly to over-deterrence is largely speculative, and there is reason to 
fear that under-deterrence is the more likely risk even when damages are 
available.297  Further, amidst the concern about deterrence we should not 
lose sight of the fact that damages also serve the critical goal of 
compensating people for harms inflicted by governments and their 
agents.298
I do not mean to dismiss the over-deterrence argument out of hand.  
The question whether testimony has been compelled in violation of the 
privilege or coerced in violation of due process turns on the totality of the 
circumstances.299  Tests of this kind can easily be applied inconsistently, 
which would make the deterrent effects of civil rights claims uncertain as 
compared to the status quo of no claims at all except under substantive due 
process.  While the shocks the conscience and fundamental rights tests risk 
being under-inclusive, the totality of the circumstances standard risks being 
over-inclusive.  This may be particularly true if claims can be brought by 
any suspect who feels she was subjected to compulsion or coercion whether 
or not she actually provided incriminating information.
Against this concern rests the fact that civil rights litigation requires 
plaintiffs to navigate a variety of hurdles that screen out large numbers of 
claims, including many that would be valid on the merits.300 Plaintiffs 
whose confessions were admitted at their criminal trial and who were 
convicted of a crime will have a particularly difficult time bringing 
successful claims.301 Plaintiffs who made incriminating statements but 
were never charged are likely not to bring claims unless the official conduct 
was fairly severe (as in Chavez), at least in part because damages awards are 
297 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation 
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 370 (2000); see also Parry, Judicial 
Restraints, supra note 6, at 113-15 (summarizing this issue).
298 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (“the basic purpose of a § 1983 damages 
award should be to compensate”).  
299 See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
300 See Parry, Judicial Restraints, supra note 6, at 111-13 (explaining that, because of the 
many obstacles to successful § 1983 litigation, damages rarely manage to provide full 
compensation on an individual or aggregate level).
301 See Klein, Deconstitutionalized, supra note 55, at 445-48 (noting collateral estoppel 
may prevent plaintiffs from relitigating admissibility of purportedly compelled testimony, 
citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), and damages for a conviction and wrongful 
imprisonment will be unavailable unless the plaintiff can first overturn her conviction, 
citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).
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likely to be small if the jury learns of the statements (assuming juries are 
unlikely to reward someone they see as a wrongdoer except in very 
compelling cases). As a result, the plaintiffs most likely to have viable 
claims are precisely those who were mistreated, made no incriminating 
statements, and were released.  Damages in many of these cases are likely 
to be small as well, with the result that not all plaintiffs will come forward.  
Recognizing a broader cause of action, in short, is unlikely to open the flood 
gates of litigation unless the level of compulsion routinely employed by law 
enforcement officials is more severe than most of us likely would expect.
Because the concern about over-deterrence is real but not overriding, 
the easiest way to address it is simply not to allow damages for all
violations of the privilege or due process.  Justice Kennedy, for example, 
would require more than a violation of Miranda before making damages 
available, while Justice Souter would allow damages for violations of the 
privilege (including Miranda) only in compelling cases.302  These more 
nuanced positions remind us that we can exclude claims in which the 
compulsion was relatively minor or merely presumed – that is, claims in 
which the right is weaker and the appropriate remedy is exclusion or 
immunity.  We should not embrace Justice Kennedy’s or Justice Souter’s 
specific positions too quickly, however.  Preventing damages for all 
violations of Miranda while also maintaining all of the exceptions that 
allow admission of compelled testimony at trial would, in Susan Klein’s 
words, “render Miranda ineffectual.”303  Justice Souter’s desire to limit 
damages to truly extraordinary cases would have an even more severe 
impact on the privilege as a whole.  The damages remedy must be more 
expansive even if it does not apply in all cases. 
The over-deterrence argument has a final piece in an era in which 
law enforcement must guard against terrorism as well as ordinary crime.  In 
a situation of over-deterrence, law enforcement officials will play it safe, 
which translates into less effective policing and a re sulting increase in at 
least certain kinds of crimes.  Increased crime, of course, means more harm 
and less social welfare (assuming we exclude or discount the benefits to 
criminals).  Even if one is willing to accept increased crime as the price for 
increased liability, the calculus should change – so the argument goes –
when the resulting harm increases exponentially.  Terrorism provides this 
exponential increase in harm, and so those who formerly were skeptical 
302 See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2007 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2013 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
303 Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1355.  Chavez, of course, appears to do exactly this, but 
cases pending before the Court create the opportunity to undo some of the damage.  See
supra note 8.
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about over-deterrence need to rethink their position.
This argument also has force, but the substantive due process 
framework already provides that otherwise improper police conduct may be 
justified by exigent circumstances, and this exception could continue to be a 
part of any new model we adopt.  More generally, despite the real concern 
about terrorism, the fact remains that the bulk of law enforcement resources, 
particularly at the state and local levels, are devoted to preventing and 
solving more common crimes.  If we need special rules for terrorism, then 
we should apply them in that context rather than across the board.  E xtreme 
cases should not control everyday doctrine.304
Taking all of these concerns into account, the best way to manage 
the gap is to allow damages where the plaintiff can prove (1) an intentional
violation of Miranda,305 (2) conduct that actually compels testimony in vio-
lation of the privilege or renders a confession involuntary in violation of 
due process, or (3) conduct that under the circumstances amounts to 
compulsion or coercion as an objective matter whether or not a confession 
or other incriminating statement results.306 This position weeds out minor 
cases where there was no actual compulsion and little fault can be ascribed 
to the interrogator, but it also increases deterrence, advances the goal of 
compensation, and confirms the privilege (including Miranda) and due 
process as rights that constrain conduct outside the courtroom.307
304 Cf. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 312 (3rd ed. 
1999) (“The danger of such extreme examples is that, by focusing our attention on the rare 
and exceptional, they may train us to see moral choice only when it is presented in stark 
terms . . . .  The hard ethical questions in life arise not only in those rare instances that 
mirror the moralist’s stark hypotheticals, but also in the vaguer, infinitely more complex 
arena of ordinary life.”).
305 See Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1354-55 (making this argument).
306 In the second and third categories, the general rule of Colorado v. Connelly – that police 
conduct and not the suspect’s mental condition is the touchstone – would remain in place.  
See 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986); cf. Klein, Deconstitutionalized, supra note 55, at 471-73 
(raising concerns about damages for all involuntary confessions because liability might 
turn on “the particular susceptibility of the suspect” rather than on the amount of coercion).
More generally, the focus on intent and actual conduct during interrogation should allow 
my proposal to skirt the Court’s reluctance to allow damages for negligent deprivations of 
due process rights.  See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1998); 
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
307 When I suggest this is the best result, I mean that the Supreme Court should back away 
from its holdings and suggestions in Chavez and adopt this position instead.  Critically, 
however, and in line with my discussion of its proper role on constitutional interpretation, 
Congress could prohibit damages in such cases by statute.  (What Congress cannot do is 
modify the remedies so much that the privilege is reduced to being only a trial right.)  Note, 
as well, that if damages were available for violations of the voluntariness test, then it could 
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An obvious objection to this proposal is that it allows overlapping 
causes of action in contradiction to the doctrine of Graham v. Connor.308
But with five justices willing to ignore that doctrine in Chavez, the
objection has little force.  To the extent it does, the Court should abandon 
Graham.309 One could also object that including intentional violations of 
Miranda, which allows damages in some cases even without actual 
compulsion, makes Miranda stronger than it ought to be.  If Miranda were 
already a strong doctrine, this objection would have force.  But Miranda is 
riddled by numerous exceptions, and allowing damages for intentional 
violations is a rough way to even the playing field.  If the Court were to rein 
in the exceptions and make Miranda a more powerful rule of exclusion,310
then allowing the additional remedy of damages might make the right too 
powerful, which in turn would justify capping the remedies short of 
damages.
A more significant objection is that allowing damages for all 
compelled or involuntary confessions would ultimately lead the Court to
raise the standard for excluding testimony.  The unintended consequence of 
my proposal, in other words, would not only be fewer damages claims than 
I anticipate, but also fewer excluded confessions.  Criminal suspects could 
end up worse off.  This strikes me as a significant concern.  Yet if, as I have 
suggested, the number of claims under my proposal is not overly high, a 
careful Court that looked beyond the breathless claims made in briefs and 
actually considered what was happening in the district courts would feel 
little incentive to modify the totality of the circumstances test.311
Finally, one could advance a textual objection to allowing claims for 
violations of the privilege even when no incriminating testimony has been 
compelled.  The Fifth Amendment bars compelling a person “to be a 
witness against himself,”312 and one could reasonably argue these words 
require not just compulsion but compulsion of a statement.  As a result, my 
be described as a substantive due process right.  Thus, one way to describe my proposal on 
the due process side is as a large expansion of a substantive due process right to be free of 
coercive interrogation and abandonment of the shocks the conscience standard
308 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
309 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
310 See supra note 122, 233.
311 For example, charges of too many civil rights cases are probably overstated, and in any 
event success rates in civil rights claims are lower than in other categories of cases, which 
should give some pause to reflexive claims of over-deterrence.  See THEODORE EISENBERG, 
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 172-82 (5th ed. 2004) (summarizing 
several studies); Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review, 5 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 492-96 (1997).
312 U.S. CONST., amend V.
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proposal would have to be rewritten to allow damages for violations of the 
privilege when incriminating testimony was compelled, and damages for 
violations of due process whether or not a confession resulted.313
I am relatively agnostic about this modification.  On the one hand, I 
am not convinced the text requires this limitation.  On the other hand, ad-
mitting the objection and making the modification might also address the 
objection that my proposal would harm suspects by raising the bar for ex-
cluding confessions.  If damages were available only when a statement was 
actually compelled in violation of the privilege, the class of potential plain-
tiffs for that cause of action would decrease and the Court would feel less 
pressure to tinker with the test for compulsion.  At the same time, however, 
if damages remain available for violations of the due process voluntariness 
standard, then the Court might raise the bar on the due process side.  The 
result could be a distinction between compulsion under the privilege and 
involuntariness under due process.314 Again, such a result probably would 
be unnecessary because the increase in litigation would not be nearly as 
great as over-deterrence agitators tend to assume.  Yet so long as the 
standard for excluding incriminating statements under the privilege remains 
the same, then raising the bar on the due process side – so long as it stops 
well short of current substantive due process standards – may be a price 
worth paying.
CONCLUSION
The fractured decision in Chavez displays the tensions in self-
incrimination and due process jurisprudence.  One group of justices seeks to 
rein in the privilege by transforming large parts of current doctrine into 
prophylactic rules that may be subject to congressional override.  While 
admitting a damages remedy for violations of substantive due process, they 
would define the cause of action so narrowly and create such significant 
exceptions that few will ever be able to take advantage of it.  On the other 
end of the Court, Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg – and probably Justice 
Stevens as well – seek to create a broad remedy against coercive 
interrogation practices.  The justices in the middle hold the balance of 
power, yet they seem unable to articulate a complete approach.
Especially in the self-incrimination context, the Court’s tensions are 
313 This revision would also help satisfy proponents of Graham v. Connor.
314 As I noted earlier, Stephen Schulhofer has long advocated a distinction between 
compulsion under the privilege and involuntariness under due process.  See supra notes 
261-62 and accompanying text.  I doubt, however, that he would embrace the distinction I 
develop in the text.  His view is that the current standard for compulsion is too high and 
should be lowered relative to due process, and so he would presumably prefer a single 
totality of the circumstances test for both provisions to a harder due process test.
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magnified by its unwillingness to recognize remedies as integral parts of 
constitutional rights and a corresponding inability to use remedies to shape 
doctrine.  The justices in the middle come closest to appreciating the 
importance of remedies, but rather than spark doctrinal change, that 
realization risks producing uncertainty.  Concerns about terrorism, unstated 
in the opinions but on display in the briefs, feed the uncertainty of the 
middle and strengthen the hand of the justices who would narrow the 
privilege and limit the scope of substantive due process.
For all of this, Chavez could mark a turning point in constitutional 
jurisprudence.  Faced with doctrinal tension that results in part from 
ignoring the proper place of remedies and wallowing in the swamp of 
prophylactic rules, the Court should choose a different course.  The idea of 
prophylactic rules should be abandoned.  Because the Constitution is 
imprecise, all constitutional doctrine fails to match with one or the other 
ideal interpretation of the document, but the doctrine is nonetheless 
constitutional law in every sense of the term.  Critically, however, the 
Court’s understanding of the Constitution must make more room for 
Congress.  With its admitted power over the precise scope of remedies, 
Congress necessarily plays a role in creating constitutional meaning.
In the context of coercive interrogation, these insights should lead 
the Court to recognize that the immunity remedy makes the privilege more 
than a trial right even as Congress may be able to modify the periphery of 
the doctrine, including Miranda.  Similarly, by taking a remedial approach, 
we also learn that rights enforceable through damages actions are worth 
more than right enforceable through more limited remedies.  Most 
unconstitutionally coercive interrogation – whether under the privilege or 
under due process – falls in the latter category.  As a result, the right to be 
free of coercion is weak.  Only damages can make it strong.
